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Abstract
Countries like Estonia, Norway or Australia developed electronic voting systems, which
could be used to realize parliamentary elections with the help of personal computers and
the Internet. These systems are completely different in their design and their way to solve
the same problem.
In this thesis, we analyze some of the largest real-world systems, describe their building
blocks and their general design to focus on possible problems in these electronic voting
systems.
Furthermore, we present a template for an e-voting system, which we designed to try to
fulfill the preliminaries and requirements of a secure electronic voting system. We use
the experiences and the building blocks of existing systems to combine them to another
more secure system. Afterwards, we compare our concept with real-world systems to
evaluate the fulfillments of the requirements. Conclusively, we discuss the occurring
problems when designing a secure system.
Peer-to-peer networks provide many advantages, like decentralization, which might be
applicable to electronic voting systems. Therefore, we take a look on the distributed
database called blockchain1 and the usage in a peer-to-peer voting system.
Our contribution to this topic is a modification of the proof-of-stake, which enables the
usage of common devices, like smartphones or tablets, for the blockchain verification and
inclusion of new ballots to the chain. This proof does not need much computing power
and has a lower carbon footprint than the proof-of-work in the Bitcoin protocol.
1The blockchain is a distributed database, which was first introduced with the Bitcoin protocol.
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Chapter 1
Motivation
1.1 Traditional Voting
One basic principle of a democracy is an equal and fair voting system: eligible voters are
allowed to freely vote for their favorable party or candidate. This is one of the pillars of
our political system and therefore needs to be guaranteed in a democracy.
Some Problems in Parliamentary Elections
Democracy and voting are great ideas, but the classical paper ballots are prone to fraud;
ballots can be counted incorrectly or ballots sent via mail might get lost in transit. To
show examples for failure or fraud, we focus for this list on the parliamentary elec-
tions from Germany in 2005, because they are well documented. Examples are taken
from [ZEI13]:
• First counting in Bochum-Langendreer marked 491 of 689 votes as invalid. Two
minor parties were announced as the strongest in this district. After recounting the
ballots, only 13 ballots were marked as invalid. A different, third party became
strongest party.
1
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• In one state the ballots were not correctly assigned to the parties, which led to a
bad result for a small party.
• Paper ballots sent via postal mail take a long time until they are tallied. Obser-
vations showed that even ten days might not be sufficient to request and send the
ballot back before the election ends.
• An external company was delegated to distribute paper ballots for one city. Unfor-
tunately, they sent 50,000 ballots to the wrong recipients. Due to this error 10,533
ballots became invalid.
These are only a few examples for potential problems with traditional paper voting and
they are not the only exceptions. This does not mean that all elections are compromised
or completely insecure.
High Cost
Another factor are the costs of an election. We focus on the numbers from Germany
again.
The parliamentary election for the Bundestag in 2009 did cost about 67 million Euros
in total. Cities with less than 100,000 eligible voters received 0.48 Euro per voter, big-
ger cities even 0.74 Euro [The11]. Additionally, volunteers, who support an election,
received another monetary compensation for their help. This is a massive amount of
money being normally spent every parliamentary election.
One possible solution to reduce the costs and to optimize the general voting process is
the usage of computers.
2
1.2 Electronic Voting Systems
1.2 Electronic Voting Systems
As technology evolves, it is obvious to consider about using computers for elections. In
this thesis we will focus on distributed voting systems, which we define as systems
using the Internet to realize political elections. To access these voting systems, each
eligible voter can use her own device, for example personal computer, smartphone or
tablet. These systems will also secure and anonymize the ballots to ensure the election,
which fulfills the democratic rights of each citizen. We take a further look at these
requirements and constructions in the next chapters.
Electronic voting systems attempt to be as easy to use and secure as ideal traditional elec-
tions and attempt to eliminate the human errors described in 1.1. This is hard to achieve,
because electronic voting systems need a strong encryption to guarantee security, in-
tegrity and anonymity of the vote. This must be ensured and still result in a user-friendly
application, which is often hard to achieve.
But to assume that traditional elections are completely secure and correct is also ques-
tionable, as we already showed in section 1.1. So, this is a good opportunity to think
about reinventing elections with the help of computers and cryptography.
One of the main advantages of electronic voting systems is the chance to call a com-
pletely verifiable election, which means that all voters are able to verify if their vote was
properly counted and even that the complete election was properly tallied.
Some countries use dedicated voting machines, which are used to place votes in polling
stations. These voting machines are exclusively used for the voting process and can ei-
ther tally the votes electronically or create strips of papers with the voter’s choice, which
must later be tallied. Usually, it is not possible to verify tallying steps of these black
boxes, because the companies do not provide details about the implementation of their
machines; only the main developers have access to the source code and know in detail,
how these machines operate.
After an analysis of 74 voting machines, the Chaos Computer Club (CCC), which is
Europe’s largest association of hackers, summarized their results with one short quote
[Cha06]:
“Trust is a good thing, control not possible” (CCC, 2006)
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The CCC observed in 2006 a pilot project in Cottbus, Germany, where voting machines
were used. They explained in their analysis of this election that with these issues in secu-
rity and verifiability, voting machines should be banned and not be used in any election.
Missing verifiability led to the prohibition of current voting machines for elections in
Germany. As long as the essential steps of the voting process are not in public verifiable
by a typical citizen, voting machines are forbidden in parliamentary elections [The09].
These are also the reasons why we do not consider voting machines in this thesis.
Electronic Voting Systems in the Real World
Some governments already implemented electronic voting systems and use them for par-
liamentary elections. For example Estonia has several years of experience in this field
and successfully uses electronic voting for all of their elections. Other projects encoun-
tered, but they all had big security issues and were often cancelled. That the Estonian
electronic voting system is still being used in practice does not mean that this voting
system is secure. We will analyze it in section 4.1.
We feel confident that many countries will use electronic voting systems in the future to
realize their elections, because this technology could heavily improve the voting process.
Therefore, it is essential to analyze existing systems, learn from their experiences and try
to solve the issues which emerged during their trials, which is the core of this thesis. We
also describe basic approaches to realize a voting system with clients and servers and
give a brief view into a peer-to-peer approach using the blockchain.
1.3 Structure
In chapter 2 we define the preliminaries and requirements of an election. This also in-
cludes some assumptions we had to include to realize a voting system. Since security,
anonymity and integrity must be guaranteed by computers, we have to use cryptography
to solve these issues. The cryptographic primitives used by many voting systems are
described in chapter 3.
4
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Chapter 4 contains a selection of popular e-voting systems, a description of their design
and their major problems. These systems are compared with each other to provide a brief
overview of their building blocks.
With the knowledge of these real-world systems, we choose building blocks for a secure
voting system in chapter 5.
During our research, we found a promising approach using the blockchain. We designed
a suitable proof-of-work replacement and described it in the same chapter.
Our evaluation in chapter 6 analyzes if our construction fulfills the preliminaries and
compares our system with the real-world systems from chapter 4.
In chapter 7 we summarize our findings and give an overview about future work.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Electronic voting systems claim to be at least as secure as ideal traditional voting systems
like paper ballots. In fact, paper ballots (or even special voting machines) have many
potential security issues as seen in 1.1. With the correct use of cryptography these issues
can be limited, which is a great advantage of e-voting systems. Some requirements have
to be fulfilled to make a voting system applicable for the real-world. This list is based
on [CCM08, DKR10, KRS10] and the systems we describe in chapter 4.
Availability An e-voting system must remain available during the whole election and
must serve voters connecting from their devices.
Especially, the e-voting system must be prepared for high workload, because there will
be periods where many voters will place their vote simultaneously.
Eligibility Only eligible voters are allowed to cast a ballot, whilst only one vote per
voter counts. If it is allowed to vote multiple times (also called re-vote), the most recent
ballot will be tallied and all others must be discarded.
Integrity The integrity of the vote must be guaranteed.
Voting systems must ensure that the ballots are not altered during any step of the election.
Otherwise we can not trust this system.
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Anonymity and Election Secrecy The connection between the vote of a user and the
user herself must not be reconstructable without her help.
Fairness Voting systems must ensure that no (partial) results are published before the
tallying has ended. Otherwise voters can be influenced by these results and vote differ-
ently.
Correctness The election results must be properly counted and correctly published.
Robustness The system should be able to tolerate (some) faulty votes.
Attackers might try to cast malicious ballots, but these ballots must be detected. A vot-
ing system has to recognize these ballots to prevent vote-manipulation or attacks on the
servers.
Universal Verifiability After the tallying process, the results are published and must
be verifiable by everybody.
The electronic voting system must provide mechanisms to verify the election’s outcome.
This depends on the building blocks the system is built upon and must not break other
preliminaries.
Voter Verifiability The voter herself must be able to verify that her ballot arrived in the
ballot box.
This ensures that the voter is sure her vote was counted and was not modified.
Coercion Freeness Voting systems must provide security mechanisms to prevent a
coercer from being able to force the voter to place a vote for a specific party, candidate
etc. or even to see that she voted [Oka98]. This is also called receipt-freeness.
A voting system must be built coercion-resistant to guarantee that a voter can place her
vote as intended even in the presence of a coercer. Even vote-selling must be unattractive
8
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or too expensive. Coercion is a major problem in voting systems and we discuss it in
detail in subsection 6.3.1.
Summary
These requirements are necessary for a secure e-voting system, which adds complexity
and makes secure design and a usable interface more difficult. The big challenge for
voting systems is to fulfill as many requirements as possible and create a secure voting
system that is easy enough for everybody to understand and to use.
Coercion and receipt-freeness are the most challenging requirements. On the one hand
it is necessary to provide the option to verify her own vote, but this is always coupled to
some kind of receipt. On the other hand a voter must not be able to prove her choice to a
coercer. We will discuss this later in subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.
Voter- and universal-verifiability are needed to achieve end-to-end verifiability, which
is the possibility to verify the complete voting process. This includes all steps from
the composition of the own ballot over sending the vote to the ballot boxes through the
anonymization servers to the tallying process [BRR+15]. It is sufficient to provide proofs
for the separate steps showing that the servers worked as expected (see zero-knowledge-
proofs, section 3.2).
2.1 Assumptions
We have to make few assumptions, which are required to make our constructed electronic
voting system described in chapter 5 possible and useful. Many systems from chapter 4
make similar assumptions (see [DGA12, CCM08]), which is why we already want to
introduce them:
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Assumption 1: The voter’s computer can be trusted
We assume that it is possible to securely run the voting application on the voter’s device.
This excludes malicious software, which might be installed on the voter’s device and
might unobtrusively alter her ballot.
Assumption 2: The election is correctly set up
The election must be set up correctly, which means that the candidates and parties are in-
cluded in the election, there are only eligible voters allowed to place a ballot and nothing
is compromised prior the election. Without this assumption, the election itself is already
non-trustworthy and can not produce a reliable outcome.
Assumption 3: Not all trustees of the election are compromised
We describe the election’s building blocks in chapter 5 and describe how many trustees
must not be malicious for the system to work properly, e.g. it takes at least one trustwor-
thy server in the mix-net to provide anonymity of the ballots (see 5.9.3). This assumption
shows that a minimum number of the trustees is trustworthy and this makes a reliable
election possible.
Assumption 4: At least one person verifies the results
There should be at least one person who verifies the results at the end of an election. This
makes it unlikely that the election has been compromised when at least one person is able
to reproduce the result. Since the election’s outcome should be public and verifiable, it
does not matter who this person is, but she should publish her results to approve the
outcome or that she found irregularities in the tallying process.
10
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Cryptographic Primitives
This chapter briefly describes some of the cryptographic primitives which are used in
many electronic voting systems. These are the building blocks of some of the biggest
real-world systems and are used in several different combinations.
3.1 Public Key Cryptography
In real world voting systems, the asymmetric cryptography is heavily used to de-/encrypt
or sign a ballot. Based on algorithms like RSA, the “classical” way is used to gain
advantage of this technique. Thereby, each voter and the election server maintains a
key-pair.
Encrypt with
Election’s Public Key
101000010110101100011100001110
001100110001000111000000011011
001011000110110001010010001110
101100100111011011100110110101
010011110001011001001111110111
111000111001000010001100010111
001001011011011111001000110111
010010111011110101100010100100
010000110000101101011110000111
001000111011110000001000011001
000000010101110100010010010010
011110001100010001111011110100
101000010110011001011100110010
011101000101010111110010011010
101100100001100100011010010110
001111101000001100101011101111
011101001101001010001100111
Sign Encrypted Ballot
with Voter’s Private Key
“Outer” Envelope
Ballot
Jon Snow
Ned Stark
...
x
“Inner” Envelope
“Inner” Envelope
Figure 3.1: Double Envelope – a Signed and Encrypted Ballot
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Mostly, the technique of a double envelope is chosen in electronic voting systems, which
is being used for postal ballots: In the inner envelope is the ballot of the voter m, which is
encrypted with the election’s public key enc(m)pub_el , i.e. it is “packed” into a ciphertext.
The outer envelope contains the signature of the voter, who signs just that encrypted
ballot with her private key sig(enc(m)pub_el)priv_voter. This is illustrated in figure 3.1.
With this packed ballot, the voter can contact a voting server, which can verify if she is
eligible to vote by checking the signature. If she is eligible, the ballot is stored in the
election’s database. Before tallying the ballots, the signature is stripped off and should
be passed through a mix-net (see 3.4) or similar to guarantee anonymity during and after
the tallying process.
Advantages The concept of public key cryptography is well understood and generally
easy to implement. Therefore, explaining it to voters is not difficult and there are several
libraries existing to be used in the source code of the voting system.
Drawbacks A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is needed to maintain all public keys
of the voters. This can be combined with the registration for the election and with the
validation of the voter’s eligibility.
It takes a lot of computational power to decrypt all votes, so publishing the results might
take a while.
Usage Most electronic voting systems rely on public key cryptography (see 4.1, 4.3,
4.4, 4.5). In general, this is currently best practice as long as it is well implemented and
the keys are long enough. But intelligence agencies, like the NSA, take deep interests
in manipulating the RSA standard and bribed the developers $10 million to make a ma-
nipulated random number generator, based on the RSA’s Dual Elliptic Curve, the new
default system [Tho14].
Therefore, developers must be very careful while implementing RSA in their voting sys-
tems and must choose (currently) safe algorithms for random number generation.
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3.2 Zero-Knowledge-Proofs
Zero-knowledge-proofs (ZKP) are used when Alice wants to prove to Bob that a specific
statement is true without revealing any information, except that this statement is indeed
true. Therefore, no knowledge is transferred even if at least one of them is malicious.
This proof can be applied multiple times, while with each execution of it the probability
that Alice just pretends to know the secret significantly decreases and Bob can verify the
correctness [HL97, Bra06]. It also decreases the probability that Alice just guessed the
correct solution.
ZKPs can be interactive or non-interactive. In the non-interactive variation only one party
is actively needed to verify the proof, whilst in the interactive one both parties communi-
cate together in a certain way. Voting systems mostly use non-interactive ZKPs since the
voter can verify several steps without needing an active part of the voting system. This
is favorable for the voting system, because it does not need to spend any resources for
these proofs, except the initial resources needed to create the proof.
Existing heuristics allow it to transform an interactive zero-knowledge-proof into a non-
interactive ZKP [BPW12]. These heuristics were exemplary applied to the Helios voting
system (see 4.7.1).
In the context of electronic voting systems, zero-knowledge-proofs are mostly used to
provide verifiability for a step inside the voting system, e.g. when the ballots are passed
through a mix-net server. This is useful, since it proves the correctness of each task from
the anonymization over the tallying process up to the correct decryption for calculating
the results.
Advantages Zero-knowledge-proofs Provide the possibility to validate the ballots and
enables end-to-end verifiability, when the proofs are publicly available.
Drawbacks The communication in interactive ZKPs contains many messages between
voting server and verifier, which leads to a big overhead for just verifying the proof. But
as said it is possible to use non-interactive proofs, which are sufficient for our purposes.
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Usage Zero-knowledge-proofs are needed for verification. Therefore, many systems
use and combine them with other primitives, because it is an easy way to verify the
results of an operation (for example see 4.3, 4.5). This primitive is an essential building
block to achieve end-to-end verifiability.
3.3 Homomorphic Encryption
The homomorphic encryption scheme is a subset of the public key cryptography (see 3.1),
where mathematical operations directly on the ciphertexts are possible. These mathemat-
ical operations might be the re-encryption of the ciphertext without changing the content
(see 3.3.2) or the possibility to aggregate the ciphertexts to add up the values of encrypted
votes.
For example: assume the ballots a and b are encrypted with a homomorphic scheme to
a = enc(2) and b = enc(3). Than they can be aggregated to a⊙ b and this operation
leads to the same result as enc(2+ 3) = dec(a⊙ b) = 5 [HS00]. So, there is no need
to decrypt each ciphertext to tally them. The next section describes the structure of the
ballots before we can apply this directly on electronic voting systems.
3.3.1 Restrictions and Usage in Electronic Voting Systems
When using an encryption scheme which uses homomorphic properties allowing the
addition on the ciphertexts, like ElGamal, there is a restriction in the structure of the
ballot: the ballots must be encoded with bits before they are encrypted. This means that
the candidate the voter wants to vote for gets a 1 whilst all other candidates have a 0
stored in the corresponding position. For example, Alice wants to vote for the second
candidate on the list. Her ballot must look like 010 . . . , which is then encrypted. Vectors
can also be used for this data structure, which support more votes for each candidate.
Because of this structure, it is only suitable for elections where yes or no are possible
answers for the candidates. Write-in-ballots, as they are used in the United States, are
therefore not supported. We can not encode a string, e.g. the name of a candidate, into
one bit and the homomorphic addition does not support addition of strings.
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Applied to electronic voting system we consider the following example. We have three
candidates, Alice wants to vote for candidate 2, Bob for candidate 3 and Charly also
for the second candidate. The resulting ballots are encrypted with the election’s public
key:
Alice : a = encrypt(010) (3.1)
Bob : b = encrypt(001) (3.2)
Charly : c = encrypt(010) (3.3)
When the election ends and the vote count starts, we can easily use the addition on the
ciphertexts, which directly produces the correct outcome of the election. The result must
be decrypted with the election’s private key and might look like this:
res = a⊙b⊙ c (3.4)
decrypt(res) = 021 (3.5)
This result can be decoded and leads to the expected result. Candidate 1 has zero votes,
candidate 2 has two and only one person voted for candidate 3. If we would allow
write-ins in this example, it would not be possible to simply add the ciphertexts, because
we can not apply the simple addition on strings. Assuming Alice is candidate 2 in this
example, the homomorphic property can not aggregate the two ballots containing “Alice”
+ “Alice”. In an election, we would expect the sum “2”, but this is not possible with this
property and this is also the reason why write-ins are not supported.
False inputs might cause unexpected errors, since the falsy composition is not compatible
with the homomorphic addition. Therefore, most voting systems use Zero-Knowledge-
Proofs (described in 3.2) to guarantee that they encrypted a correct ballot matching the
chosen data structure.
3.3.2 Re-Encryption of Ciphertexts
Some encryption schemes enable re-encryption, again for example ElGamal. This is
another mathematical component, additional to e.g. encrypt() or decrypt(), which re-
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randomizes the random factor in a ciphertext [GJJS04]. This results in a different-looking
ciphertext, although it still contains the same content.
For example: a ciphertext {m}rk encrypted with the public key k and a random factor
r could be re-encrypted with the same m,r,k and a new random factor r′ to {m}r+r′k =
renc(m,r′) [GRBR13]. This operation does not need the private key of the election
and is therefore not decrypted, thanks to the homomorphic property for example pro-
vided by ElGamal [GJJS04]. This is a basic primitive for mix-nets (explained in the
next section 3.4), because a mix-net takes the ballots, creates a permutation of them and
re-encrypts them for anonymization. Therefore, we can achieve anonymity of a set of
ballots with this property when we rearrange the order of the ballots and change the out-
ward appearance of the ciphertexts. To guarantee that the re-encryption is correct and
the ballot’s integrity is ensured, the re-encryption can be made verifiable with the help of
zero-knowledge-proofs (see 3.2).
Advantages These encryption schemes with homomorphic properties have several
benefits for electronic voting systems, which depend on the algorithms. Being able to
aggregate the ciphertexts simplifies the tallying process, since only one decryption is
needed after all ballots were aggregated.
Different schemes of homomorphic encryption also enable a number of mechanisms, like
secret-sharing or the re-encryption of the ballots, which is heavily used in voting systems
which use mix-nets for anonymization.
Keys generated with a homomorphic scheme, can also be used normally as seen in the
public key cryptography 3.1.
Drawbacks Some schemes are only suitable for elections where yes or no are possible
answers.
Another big drawback is the computing time needed to aggregate homomorphic en-
crypted ballots. This is very complex and might not be applicable on big amounts of
encrypted ballots. Kristian Gjøsteen from the Norwegian University of Science and
Technology is researching for the Norwegian voting system to massively reduce the size
of the ciphertexts to decrease the computational time and presents some mathematical
approaches [Gs13].
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The developers of Civitas tried to benchmark the effort needed to decrypt the ballots with
respect to different parameters [CCM08].
Usage Homomorphic encryption is heavily used in the Norwegian e-voting system
(see 4.3), where the homomorphic property is used to count the ballots. They have the
problem that the ciphertexts are too big and decryption takes too much time.
Civitas (see 4.5) uses ElGamal for their re-encryption scheme after the votes passed the
mix-net (see 3.4).
3.4 Mix-Nets
Mix-net based voting schemes use the same technique as Tor to anonymize a user’s traffic
while surfing the Web: Multiple mix-servers are used to remove connections to the voter.
They shuffle and re-encrypt the ballots to make them look different than they looked the
step before. The correctness of the result can be verified using zero-knowledge-proofs,
which each authority has to publish after shuffling. The mix-servers can be used to
anonymize the ballots, because these servers remove the connection of the voter’s signa-
ture and her vote and re-encrypt the ballots. As long as there exists at least one honest
mix-server, the anonymity of the voter is guaranteed [SK95, AMV14].
Some voting systems use this technique as an extension to achieve anonymity [Nef01].
Re-encryption is needed, because otherwise the rearranged ballots will look the same, but
in a different order. Following the notation from subsection 3.3.2, the sequence of en-
crypted ballots S = m1, . . . ,mn are formed to a different sequence S′ = m′1, . . . ,m′n, which
is a re-encryption of S. Also, the order of the ballots has changed with the permutation
σ of {1, . . . ,n}. The new random factors r′1, . . . ,r′n are then used to re-encrypt S to get
S′: m′1 = renc(mσ(1),r′1), . . . ,m′n = renc(mσ(n),r′n) [GRBR13]. As a result, S′ is returned,
which can later be decrypted with the election’s private key [GJJS04]. There is no private
key needed to re-encrypt the ballots.
All these steps can be verified with ZKPs, which each server in the mix-net has to pub-
lish.
Mix-nets require an encryption scheme, which supports re-encryption, like ElGamal.
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Advantages Mix-net servers provide anonymity with a simple, well-known procedure
and are robust against attacks on the voter’s identity. These servers can easily be dis-
tributed among multiple and independent authorities. As long as one of these authorities
is honest, the mix is successful and the connection between the voter and her ballot is
removed. As a result all ballots are anonymized.
Drawbacks Ideally, we need many dedicated servers for a mix-net to perform the
mixes and to calculate the ZKPs. Also the cryptographic operations need many re-
sources, which are not deniable (see 3.3.2).
Usage Mix-nets are mostly used when the ballots are encrypted with a double-envelope
scheme (like in 4.3, 4.5), where the voting system wants to anonymize the ballots before
tallying (and publishing). Then the signature is stripped off and the mix-nets guaran-
tee that it is no longer possible to reconstruct the connection between the voter and her
ballot.
3.5 Secret Sharing and Threshold Encryption
To achieve distributed trust, the election’s private key can be distributed among a specific
number of trustees. Therefore, to decrypt the ballots, there is a specific threshold of
trustees needed. For example: as long as n out of m authorities are not corrupt, the keys
can be restored and used for the tallying process [Bra06, FMY98].
Advantages Distributing the key-pairs leads to a more secure and confidence inspiring
voting system, because to break the election, n ballot-tallying trustees must be corrupt,
which is much more difficult for an attacker than just compromising a single trustee.
Drawbacks If m−n+1 trustees are compromised or simply refuse to cooperate with
the other trustees, the secret is lost and can not be created. Systems, like the Norwegian
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e-voting system (see 4.3), set n = m which means that all trustees have to cooperate.
In this case it is sufficient that exactly one non-cooperating trustee could lead to a non-
reconstructible secret, like the private key.
Usage The Estonian electronic voting system (see 4.1) already implements it to create
the private key. All trustees n = m are needed to create the private key. This is the most
secure option when distributing parts of the key, because this is the highest possible value
for the threshold and no subset of them are able to create the key.
3.6 Everlasting Privacy
A critical question in encryption is what happens to the privacy when the algorithms
used for encryption are no longer secure and the ballots can than be decrypted without the
secret key. This might be possible when computing power increases or brute force attacks
allow the decryption of the ballots without the key. Research in the field of everlasting
privacy focuses on this topic to keep the ballot’s content private [ACKR13].
This is useful in several cases: Firstly, even when the ballots are published in the end of
an election, nobody would ever be able to decrypt it without the private key. Just think
about a new government, which wants to sentence someone for his ballot, which was
placed many years in the past. It is therefore very important to keep the ballot’s content
secret. Secondly, one can think about an attacker, who compromised one part of the
system, where the ballots pass by, e.g. the firewall. This attacker might copy and store
the bypassing ballots to decrypt them in the future, when there is enough computational
power available or the encryption algorithm is proven insecure.
In both cases the anonymity can be lifted, even some years in the future.
Everlasting privacy must directly be used for composing the ballots, before the ballot is
sent to the voting system.
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Advantages The ballot’s content is kept secret through the complete voting process
and is only decryptable with the election’s private key. But most important is that the
ballots are also secure against attacks and vulnerabilities in the near future.
Drawbacks The cryptography behind everlasting privacy is hard to understand, be-
cause it mostly uses the applied pi calculus [ACKR13]. Also, we found no libraries
for popular programming languages supporting the usage of everlasting privacy, which
makes it difficult for the developers to use this primitive without having a deep under-
standing of cryptography.
Usage Some scientists faced the problem and developed additions to existing sys-
tems [DGA12, Dem13] or even developed a complete voting scheme using everlasting
privacy [MN06, DG12]. But the voting systems which have been already used for real-
world elections (see chapter 4), do not use everlasting privacy at all.
3.7 Blind Signatures
In a system using blind signatures, a correctly composed ballot is signed by an authenti-
cation server without needing to decrypt it.
In the first steps the voter prepares her vote, adds a blinding factor to it and authenticates
at an authentication server of the voting system. This server checks if the voter is al-
lowed to vote, has not voted before and correctly composed her ballot. If that is true, the
authentication server signs the encrypted vote [AMV14]. After this step the voter can
remove the blinding and has the correctly signed and well-formed ballot.
To prove well-formedness of a ballot, the voter has to add a zero-knowledge-proof to her
blinded vote (see 3.2). This proof ensures that she correctly composed her ballot and
correctly added the blinding factor. The authentication server needs to verify the proof
and then signs it. This step is necessary, because only well-formed ballots contain the
designated input (e.g. exactly one vote for a valid candidate) and can later be tallied.
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After the voter receives her blinded and signed vote, she can subtract the random factor
out and has her valid vote prepared for tallying.
Advantages Blind Signatures are very simple and easy to understand, because they
can be applied on normal scenarios with offline letters: Alice prepares her vote on a
special letter, folds and seals it and wants Bob to sign it. Bob sees that the correct letter
was used and without breaking the seal he signs the letter and sends it back to Alice. She
now has her properly sealed ballot with the signature of Bob and she is now able to send
the vote to the tallying station. The station verifies the signature and counts the vote.
Drawbacks Most voting systems allow duplicate voting to prevent coercion. But
blindly signed ballots have no connection to the original voter and therefore it is not
possible to find other cast votes by the same voter to drop all except the last of her bal-
lots. This is why this primitive is only used in some theoretical schemes, but not in
real-world voting systems.
Usage None of our analyzed voting systems uses blind signatures, because they all
allow re-voting to override old ballots.
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Chapter 4
Systems
This chapter describes several real-world e-voting systems, which are used or were sup-
posed to be used for parliamentary elections in the last years.
In the end of this chapter, we will shortly focus on academical proof-of-concepts, which
provide promising ideas in enhancing current e-voting systems.
4.1 Estonian I-Voting System
Estonia is a modern country, which heavily relies on the Internet. Nearly everything is
possible with the Internet combined with their electronic national ID cards (eID). These
ID cards are used for the e-voting system. The government council election of 2005 was
the first election where their citizens were able to vote via the Internet [Maa04]. Estonia
still maintains and uses their I-voting system for the parliamentary elections.
ID cards and PKI The ID cards are realized on a Java chip platform, containing a 2048-
Bit PIN-protected RSA key-pair and creating signatures with SHA1/SHA2 [Tru13]. This
conforms to common security practices in the Web and can easily be used for authenti-
cation, encryption, signatures, etc.
Since the government distributes the ID cards, they keep track of the public keys used by
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the citizens. Therefore, authenticating at the electronic voting system and validating the
eligibility is easy, because the voter just has to create her signature with the ID card, send
this signature to the application’s authentication servers and is authenticated through the
government’s PKI.
4.1.1 Application
The application I-voting Client is developed for most popular operating systems includ-
ing Windows, Linux and Mac OS X. These applications guide the voter through the
voting process. The published version of this system already includes the election’s pub-
lic key for encryption and the complete communication with the election’s data center is
served via a HTTPS connection.
Detailed instructions, guidelines, videos1 and statistics for the voters can be found on a
special website2.
The core server code of the Estonian e-voting system is made open source, whilst the
I-voting clients, the script to post a vote and the drivers for the hardware security module
(HSM) are kept closed. The HSM is used to decrypt and count the votes and to output
the official results [HHK+14]. Therefore, most parts of the application can be crowd-
reviewed for security issues, but without reviewing all parts of the source code, complete
trustworthiness cannot be achieved. A snapshot of the core server code is published
on GitHub right before the election starts [NEC15]. The maintainers do not want to
publish the I-voting clients, because they are afraid that this would make it too easy for
an attacker to build a fake voting application, which completely looks like the original
one [HHK+14]. It is currently unknown why the maintainers do not publish the drivers
for the HSM and the script to post an e-vote.
1https://vimeo.com/112041827
2https://www.valimised.ee
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4.1.2 Voting Process
The voter has to download the application via the Internet from one of the authorized
websites. As a first step, she needs to authenticate with her electronic ID or her mobile
ID (via smartphone). If she is eligible, she gets a list with the candidates and can pick
one. This vote is being encrypted with the election’s public key, signed with the voter’s
private key (double envelope, see 3.1) and sent to the Vote Forwarding Server, which
forwards the correctly encrypted ballot to the Vote Storage Server and leaves a log entry
on a special Log Server. These three servers are deployed in a data center controlled by
the election authorities.
For verification of the vote, the Voting Client generates an unguessable token packed
into a QR Code, which can be scanned with the Voting App installed on the voter’s
smartphone. Scanning this code with the voter’s smartphone shows for which candidate
she voted for. This is only possible for three times and within 30 minutes after sending
the ballot to the data center and only as long as the eID card is still plugged into the card
reader.
The voter is allowed to vote multiple times via the I-voting client. This prevents coercion
and vote buying as the coerced vote is invalid after a new ballot has been cast; only the
last vote is being tallied. It is also possible to visit a classic ballot box and vote via paper,
which makes all electronic ballots of this voter invalid and uses the paper ballot instead,
because the paper ballot has a higher priority.
4.1.3 Tallying Process
The ballots are composed as double envelopes, therefore the connection between the
voter and her vote still exists. As a next step, this connections must be removed before
the ballots are decrypted. So, the voter’s signature needs to be stripped off from the en-
crypted ballots. These steps are performed on the Vote Storage Server and as the ballots
are anonymized, they are burned to a DVD and transferred to the air-gapped Vote Count-
ing Server. This separate server is chosen for security reasons, because the isolated Vote
Counting Server has no connection to the network, which drastically reduces the possi-
bility to compromise it or to inject malicious code. Moreover, this server is connected to
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the HSM module, which is needed to decrypt the ballots.
The election’s private key is distributed over multiple authorities as seen in 3.3. All of
these authorities have to cooperate to recreate the private key. With this key the ballots
can be decrypted and tallied.
As a last step, the election’s outcome and statistics about the election are published on
the official website [The15].
4.1.4 Public Evaluation
In the last parliamentary elections in 2015, 64.2% (577,910 voters) of the eligible voters
participated actively in the election. 30.5% (176,491 voters) of these voters used I-voting
to place their vote [Est15]. This underlines the acceptance of I-voting in the Estonian
population.
4.1.5 Security Problems
The Estonian system uses several cryptographic primitives, but there are many security
issues which we will now shortly describe.
Operational Security
Alex Halderman and three members of his team from the University of Michigan were
officially accredited observers of an election in October 2013. They observed the opera-
tions in the data centers during the election. This team published a homepage explaining
their results to the citizen [Hal15] and a paper showing procedural and operational secu-
rity issues [HHK+14]:
• “unclean” computers – personal computers were used to prepare the election soft-
ware for the public.
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• lack of security personnel – webcams are installed for security, but there was no
24/7 personnel observing it.
• WiFi passwords are pinned to a wall and recorded by a camera. These cameras
even recorded the keyboard of a maintainer typing in the root password for one of
the servers.
Since the developers of the software use their own private computers and download soft-
ware over an insecure channel, it might be possible for an attacker to serve manipulated
software from an untrusted source. This opens a security issue, where the attacker might
take over the control of the developer’s machines with the help of the manipulated soft-
ware and distribute the compromised voting application to the voters. Since the appli-
cation is not completely open source, the attacker might hide the malicious code in the
closed parts of the code.
Another big issue is that administrators are often alone at the servers. The operators of
the Estonian system specified that at least two administrators have to be together in one
room while working on the servers. This should reduce the possibility of a malicious
administrator to inject malware, modify the servers or manipulate the votes. The anal-
ysis of the Estonian system proved that the administrators did not comply with these
regulations, which makes it potentially susceptible for insider-attacks (see 6.3.4).
Technical Security
This system is vulnerable against state-level attackers, like intelligence agencies: These
attackers have access to big parts of the network traffic, enough capacities to store and
analyse it and perform timing attacks [EH96]. Therefore, an attacker could analyse the
timings of the packets needed for the communication with the voting servers to prove
with a certain percentage that a voter placed her vote. We described this attack in sec-
tion 6.3.1. An attack like this breaks the requirement that a voting system must guarantee
coercion-freeness (see chapter 2).
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Estonia
Authentication Electronic ID card
Voting Policy Multiple votes
App Structure Client/Server with native app
Distributed Dedicated servers, but all in one data center
Development Model Partly open source
Encryption Scheme Public key encryption
Ballot Anonymity Signature stripped off from the ballot
Tallying Process Separate server with offline-kept private key
Voter Verifiability 30 minutes after vote, with smartphone app
Universal Verifiability No
Table 4.1: Summary of Estonian Voting System
Centralized Infrastructure
All servers are concentrated in one data center and the system is therefore vulnerable
against DDoS or similar attacks. Distributing the servers would lead to a higher avail-
ability, but will be more expensive and complicated than just keeping everything central
in one center. Also securing distributed servers and their communication is more com-
plicated.
Client-Side Attacks
Like in all applications shipped and executed on private computers of the voters, client-
side attacks are possible, which aim to manipulate the voter’s computer. Again, in-
telligence agencies, like the BND in Germany, have a separate budget just for buy-
ing zero-day-exploits (even from the black market) to gain control over computer sys-
tems [ZEI14b]. Therefore, manipulating votes directly on the voter’s device is possibly
undetected by the voter.
Halderman and his team also describe a Ghost Attack, where the compromised computer
places a vote shortly before the 30 minutes passed after the voter was able to verify her
vote with the Voting App on her smartphone. This attack required that the eID card was
still plugged into the card reader.
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4.1.6 Summary
The ID cards use (currently) secure cryptographic functions with a PKI controlled by the
government. This enables a simple authentication at the voting system for each eligi-
ble citizen. No credentials are sent via postal mail or a similar insecure transportation
medium.
They used very simple and commonly used cryptographic primitives, so that this voting
system “can be realised with the help of IT knowledge existing in Estonia” [AOW10],
which is a great advantage, because the government does not need to trust other coun-
tries or companies to develop their voting system.
Transparency is achieved in a well-documented voting process and with the open source
code.
For voter verifiability the application displays a QR code after the ballot was sent, which
can be scanned with a mobile phone to display the content of the vote.
Allowing multiple votes reduces coercion, however it does not protect against timing at-
tacks and the resulting possibility to observe a group of voters and prove that they voted,
no matter for which party.
4.2 D.C. Digital-Vote-by-Mail Service (DVBM)
Washington, D.C. developed a pilot electronic voting system in 2010. They started a
mock election and challenged the community to test the security of this system. It was
again Alex Halderman with Scott Wolschok and his team from the University of Michi-
gan, who participated in this test and found some critical security issues in the system,
whereas the pilot project was cancelled and not used for the official election [WWIH10].
4.2.1 Application and Voting Process
DVBM is an open source web application written for Ruby on Rails, using an Apache
web server and MySQL as database. To connect to the web server, an Intrusion Detection
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System (IDS) and a firewall have to be passed through a secure HTTPS connection. An
Application Server runs the DVBM software and serves a PDF file for the voter, which
she needs to download, mark her candidate and upload the PDF file back to the server.
The PDF is being encrypted on the election’s server with the election’s public key and
passed through another firewall to the Database Server, which stores the ballot.
To get the PDF, the voter has to authenticate herself with the credentials she received
prior to the election via postal mail. These credentials contain a voter ID, registered
name, ZIP code and a 16-characters hexadecimal PIN code. The maintainers of DVBM
do not clarify why they decided to use PDFs to place the ballots.
4.2.2 Tallying Process
After the election ended, the officials transfer the encrypted ballots to a non-networked
computer and decrypt it with the offline-kept private key. This non-networked computer
is used to count the votes. As a last step, the outcome is published online on their official
website.
4.2.3 Security Problems
DVBM relies on known mechanics a normal user is familiar with: Receive a postal
mail with authentication credentials informing you to vote, authenticate at a web page,
download and fill out a PDF file and upload it. This makes it easy to understand for
non-technical people, since most of the people using the computer are familiar with web
applications and PDF files.
Therefore, it is very simple, but lacks of many security issues:
Non-Encrypted Ballots
The ballots are not being encrypted on the voter’s machine. Only the server encrypts
them to store them in the database. These unencrypted ballots enable insider-attacks
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(see 6.3.4), because a malicious maintainer of DVBM might easily copy, change or read
the ballots.
Single Point-of-Failure
The application server encrypts the ballots. Therefore, the unencrypted ballots are ac-
cessible on this server. If an attacker might get access to this server, she could be able to
manipulate the plaintext-ballots as she wishes. So, the ballots must be encrypted before
they are sent via Internet to prevent altering or reading the vote.
Coercion
This system does not provide any protection against coercion. Selling the credentials
or being forced to vote for a specific party is smoothly possible and can not be easily
revoked or overridden as we saw it in Estonia (although even their re-voting policy is not
a complete protection against coercion!).
State-Level Attacks and Anonymity
There are no mechanisms against monitoring / timing attacks in this system. Therefore,
a state-level attacker could observe the network traffic, which enables coercion.
4.2.4 Summary
DVBM tries to focus on well-known mechanics a typical voter understands. Basically,
this is a good decision, but the implementation failures make it insecure.
Also this system shows that encrypting the ballots on the servers and not locally is not a
good design decision, because it possibly enables more attacks (see 4.2.3).
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DVBM
Authentication With postal credentials
Voting Policy Fill out one PDF ballot and upload it unencrypted
App Structure Web application
Distributed Dedicated servers, but all in one data center
Development Model Closed source
Encryption Scheme Public key encryption, but only on the servers to
store them
Ballot Anonymity Unknown
Tallying Process Separate server with offline-kept private key
Voter Verifiability No
Universal Verifiability No
Table 4.2: Summary of DVBM
4.3 Norwegian I-Voting System
Norway used a remote electronic voting system for the county council elections in 2011.
The general design is similar to the Estonian system, but has some other decisions re-
garding the design, which we are going to explain in this section. It is presented as the
first governmental voting system fulfilling the requirements for coercion-resistance and
voter verifiability. The system is developed with the help of Scytl3, a Spanish company
which is awarded for the electronic voting systems they are developing.
However, in June, 2014 the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation decided
to discontinue the Internet voting pilot project due to security concerns [Min14]; many
parts of the eligible population feared that their votes could become public, which might
undermine democratic processes [BBC14].
4.3.1 Application and Voting Process
Many institutions in Norway rely on MinID, which “provides access to public services
at a medium-high level of security” [Age15]. Therefore, the maintainers also rely on this
service, since it provides a secure authentication mechanism and is already accepted by
3http://www.scytl.com/en
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Poll Card
Jon Snow: 0998
Ned Stark: 7529
...
Voted for:
0998
Poll Card received via postal Mail
Confirmaon SMS from the 
Vong System on the Voter’s Phone
Figure 4.3: Compare received SMS with the Codes on the Poll Card
the Norwegian citizen. It is free of charge and can be used to login to the e-voting system
with the voter’s national identity number, a password and a PIN code.
The e-voting client is written in Java and contains the election’s public key like the Es-
tonian system and encrypts the ballot with this public key. A signature is added with
MinID and this double-envelope ballot is sent to the ballot box.
Norway is different in how they implement voter verification compared to Estonia: Here,
the voter gets a poll card via postal mail containing a list of all parties and a corresponding
four-digit code individually calculated for each voter. We illustrated this in figure 4.3.
After the voter placed her ballot, the voting server sends an SMS to the voter’s mobile
phone containing her own 4-digit code. Now she can compare if the code she received
matches the code of her chosen party on the poll card. This gives the voter the possibility
to verify her vote.
For coercion protection, the voter is allowed to cast multiple votes, whilst the last one
counts and her previous votes are automatically revoked.
4.3.2 Tallying Process
The valid ballots are sent through a mix-net (see 3.4) to anonymize them with shuffling
and re-encryption. This mixing is verifiable with zero-knowledge-proofs (see 3.2), like
the proof-of-correct-operation [SB12]. The proof itself is described in [Gs10, Gs13].
Multiple auditors organize the tallying process, initiate to close the ballot boxes and
transfer the ballots through the mix-net to the decryptors. These decryptors log which
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anonymized ballots they received and decrypts the ballots with the offline-kept private
key and an auditor as a verifier [Gs13].
To improve this process, Gjøsteen is designing a different tallying process for the Nor-
wegian voting protocol to use homomorphic encryption and first compress the encrypted
votes and then exponentially combine the ciphertexts [Gs13]. This might significantly
reduces the computational time and makes it more suitable to tally the ballots.
4.3.3 Security Problems
The Norwegian e-voting system has some security problems resulting in the architecture
of the system:
Network Attacks
An ISP-level attacker might easily observe the traffic and create a relation between a voter
and the voting servers. Therefore, the voter is partly susceptible to coercion attacks.
Centralized Infrastructure
Centralized servers are a problem, because they are a single point of failure. An attacker
needs to compromise one server and might be able to influence the whole election.
4.3.4 Summary
This voting system tries to focus on voter verifiability besides the cryptographic secu-
rity. Double envelopes are used, the mixing achieves a reliable anonymity of the ballots
and the return-codes give the voter the possibility to verify her vote. Even the mixing is
verifiable thanks to the ZKPs published after the ballots passed the mix-net. These are
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Norway
Authentication MinID (ID number, password and PIN code)
Voting Policy Multiple votes
App Structure Client/Server with native Java app
Distributed Dedicated servers, but all in one data center
Development Model Closed source
Encryption Scheme ElGamal, homomorphic encryption scheme
Ballot Anonymity Signature stripped off from the ballot and then re-
encrypted with a mix-net
Tallying Process Decrypted and tallied
Voter Verifiability Compare displayed code in application with the provided
personalized poll card
Universal Verifiability Partly, ZKPs for shuffling published
Table 4.4: Summary of the Norwegian I-Voting System
important steps towards a secure and verifiable voting system, but it still needs improve-
ment in operational security, universal verifiability and the development model.
4.4 New South Wales iVote System
Australia started the world’s largest deployment of an e-voting system to date [HT15].
About 5% (approx. 280,000 voters) of the eligible citizen, placed their vote via iVote in
the 2015 state election in New South Wales.
This system is also developed with the help of Scytl, but the design of this voting system
is much different than the one from Norway.
4.4.1 Application and Voting Process
iVote is completely closed source and provided via a JavaScript-powered website. The
voter needs to register prior the election and receives her credentials, an 8-digit iVote
ID and sets her own 6-digit PIN. With these credentials, she can login at https://
cvs.ivote.nsw.gov.au and place her vote during the election. This system was
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designed for eligible voters which are not in Australia during the election and unable to
go to a polling station.
To place a test ballot, the New South Wales Electoral Commission prepared a mock
election reachable under a different URL using the same software as the real election.
There are three possibilities to vote with iVote: via telephone, Internet or with computers
at the polling station. The ballot is locally encrypted with a JavaScript library and then
sent to the Verification Server. After this step, the voter receives a Receipt Number to
verify her vote with an automatic telephone system or online via a Receipt Server. The
voter has to enter her iVote ID, PIN and the receipt number to get a verification that
her vote was properly counted. Verification with the telephone system ends when the
election stops, the online verification server stays available after the election.
Being able to prove for which party she voted, is similar to getting a receipt and this
enables coercion. This is not a good design decision, as coercion and vote-buying are
big problems in voting systems.
The description of the system itself is very inconsistent. For example, there exist several
descriptions about the encryption of the ballots: some say the system uses symmetric
AES with the Receipt Number to encrypt the ballots or they use ElGamal as the cho-
sen scheme with the election’s public key. Halderman et al. found that both ways are
used [HT15]. This is not the way a trustworthy voting system should be described.
4.4.2 Tallying Process
Analyzing the tallying process is not possible, because there are no publications and no
source code of the application. The Office of New South Wales Electoral Commission
describes the process on the homepage as follows: “the ballot is decrypted, audited and
counted” [Off15].
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4.4.3 Security Problems
Closed Source
It is not possible to peer-review the code. This is not a good practice, because only few
people with access to the source code are able to check it for bugs or malicious code.
Creating an open source voting system is essential for a system that shall be trusted
during an election.
Coercion
There is no coercion-protection in this system. A voter just needs some credentials and
is able to vote. Therefore, vote-selling and coercion are a big issue and should not be
underestimated.
Anonymity and Timing Attacks
This system is again vulnerable against network-level attackers, since there are no mech-
anisms for anonymity provided by the developers of iVote.
For this election, Alex Halderman and Vanessa Teague started their own independent
and uninvited security analysis of the iVote system and published their results in [HT15].
Since iVote is closed source, Halderman et al. could only analyze the web application, but
they were not eligible to vote for this election. They analyzed the HTML and JavaScript
code used for the website and found a critical security issue.
FREAK Attack
The web application uses, as it is common, multiple servers to load the JavaScript files
needed for the application. Two weeks before the election started was the FREAK at-
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tack a big issue all over the Internet: It was possible to downgrade the SSL/TLS en-
cryption to 512-bit export-grade RSA on a vulnerable web server or some (older) web
browsers [DAM+15]. This attack makes it possible to factor the RSA keys within 7
hours and about $100 with Amazon EC2 [WT15]. As a result of this downgrade, it is
possible to impersonate a web server and enables man-in-the-middle attacks.
In this case, iVote downloaded a JavaScript file from Piwik’s enterprise service4, whose
web servers were vulnerable to the FREAK attack. Halderman et al. found this issue and
reported the problem to the maintainers of iVote. The Office of New South Wales Elec-
toral Commission reacted and dropped the JavaScript file from the insecure web server,
but during this time it was theoretically possible to manipulate the votes of the 66,000
voters, which were already placed while the attack was possible.
This attack made it possible to impersonate the web servers of Piwik5 and serve manip-
ulated JavaScript code, which is for example able to alter or drop the vote. The attack
attack was possible, because the impersonated Piwik web server did not break the same-
origin-policy and could therefore be used to serve a malicious JavaScript file.
The manipulated JavaScript file enables an attack published in [HT15], where the au-
thors describe that it is very easy to copy the automatic telephone system for verification,
change the telephone number the voter gets displayed on the web site and confirm a
wrong ballot to the voter. Changing the website’s content is very easy when the attacker
has access to a JavaScript file. Therefore, the voter might not able to notice that her vote
was manipulated.
This FREAK issue has been patched during the election after Alex Halderman contacted
the responsible persons.
Consequences
The system’s FREAK vulnerability led to the possibility that an attacker might have
exploited the vulnerability to alter ballots, which were cast during this time. Until the
FREAK issue was patched, about 66,000 votes were cast, which potentially could have
been manipulated.
4Accessible through an apparently secure server: https://ivote.piwikpro.com
5Piwik is an open source tool to collect statistics of the visitors of the website, like Google Analytics.
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New South Wales iVote System
Authentication Multiple PINs, prior registration
Voting Policy Unknown
App Structure Web application
Distributed Unknown
Development Model Closed source
Encryption Scheme AES, ElGamal for the ballots
Ballot Anonymity Unknown
Tallying Process Unknown
Voter Verifiability Yes, via phone and the Internet
Universal Verifiability No
Table 4.5: Summary of iVote
This was a critical vulnerability, because only 3,177 votes were needed to decide to
whom the last seat in the Legislative Council was granted [HT15]. Therefore, the attack
might have had an impact on the results, if an attacker exploited the FREAK vulnerabil-
ity. There was no possibility to retroactively check for a FREAK attack compromise.
4.4.4 Summary
This voting system is purely web-based, which is an advantage, because the user does
not need to install any software on his computer. Encryption is completely realized
via JavaScript in the web browser, which is no problem since these web techniques are
powerful enough for this task.
Lack of description of the system leads to general mistrust with the voting; there is no
possibility to verify the voting process.
In some cases, iVote relies on the telephone for placing the vote and for voter verification.
But there is no description about the encryption of the phone call. So, we have to assume
there is none, which is a potential security issue.
Summarized, the maintainers of the system seem to ignore advances and contemporary
good practice used in other systems, although the same company was involved as in the
Norwegian system.
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4.5 Civitas
As a last system, we would like to introduce Civitas, an open source solution for elec-
tronic voting systems based on JCJ [JCJ05]. It is designed to be completely distributed
and one of the few systems which attest themselves coercion-freeness. This system has
not been used in official parliamentary elections, but is often used as an example for a
distributed, verifiable and mostly secure voting system.
Civitas is developed in Jif 6, which is a security-typed programming language extending
Java. Just as Jif, Civitas is developed and maintained by the Cornell University.
4.5.1 Initial Setup
Since Civitas is open source and well described, we can give a detailed overview [CCM08].
In the first step, the supervisor creates the election, defines the parameters (re-vote policy,
ballot design, . . . ), posts it on an empty bulletin board and selects her tellers by publish-
ing their public keys. Then the registrar defines the eligible voters with their public keys
and creates a registration and designation key for each voter. The voter receives these
keys prior to the election and the keys are based on RSA, but any other algorithm for
asymmetric key-generation could be used as well.
After this step, the tabulation tellers collectively generate a key-pair, whereby voters can
encrypt their votes and credentials with the election’s public key. This key-pair is based
on Distributed ElGamal (as seen in 3.5) and the public key is published on the bulletin
board.
As a last step, the registration tellers create the voter’s public and private credentials,
while the public part of the credentials is published on the bulletin board and the pri-
vate part is shared between all of the registration tellers. All registration tellers have to
cooperate to generate these credentials (see secret sharing, section 3.5).
6https://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif
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4.5.2 Voting Phase
Each voter authenticates with her registration key at the registration tellers to acquire a
share of her private credential. This share can be gathered with the voter’s designation
key and then run a protocol with the registration teller, which “releases the teller’s share
of the voter’s private credential to the voter” [CCM08]. The private credential is needed
to place the ballot at a distributed ballot box and must be gathered from all registration
tellers, whereby each registration teller has a part of the voter’s private credential.
Now, the voter can place her vote at one of the ballot boxes. She needs to encrypt her
private credentials and her ballot. Moreover, she needs to add a well-formed proof for
her ballot. Voting multiple times is possible if the supervisor allowed it; then only the
last vote counts.
4.5.3 Tallying Process
When the election ends, the ballot boxes sign and transmit the encrypted ballots to the
tabulation tellers. The tellers verify the proofs of well-formedness and remove the faulty
and duplicate ones. After this step, they anonymize the ballots by performing random
permutations through a mix-net (see 3.4) and verify the private credentials in the end in
accordance to the public credentials posted on the bulletin board. Then the ballots (not
the credentials) are decrypted and counted. Each ballot is published on the bulletin board
for verification by the users.
Each teller publishes her proofs on the bulletin board to make each step publicly verifi-
able.
4.5.4 Security Problems
Coercion Resistance
To create fake credentials, the voter needs her private designation key and then runs a
local algorithm. These faked private credentials are indistinguishable from the official
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credentials provided by Civitas, but ballots encrypted with them will not be tallied in the
last stage of the election.
Obvious coercion attacks are not possible with this mechanism: If an adversary wants
to buy the credentials, the voter can create fake ones and hand them out. Equally, fake
credentials can be used if someone is forced to vote for a specific candidate – the coercer
can never be sure if the real or the fake credentials were used.
Civitas’ trust assumption 4: “The channels on which voters cast their votes are anony-
mous” [CCM08] describes Tor as a solution to provide an anonymous channel, but we
demonstrated in a paper that Tor and other low-latency networks are not enough to pro-
vide an unlinkable channel, which is needed to disable timing attacks [SMHM15]. As
long as this problem is not solved, even Civitas is not coercion-resistant and coercion is
still possible.
Unpopular Programming Language
Civitas is written in Jif, which extends Java in the information flow control and access
control. The main problem of this dialect is in our opinion that there are only few people
using this language. Even if it is used as an open source application for an election, the
number of people being able to inspect the code is too low.
According to the TIOBE Index of April 2015, which measures that Jif does not even
appear in the top 100 [TIO15].
4.5.5 Summary
The cryptographic primitives used by Civitas are well chosen and current best-practices
to secure and anonymize the ballots. All design decisions are described in their publi-
cation and there exists an open source implementation of it [CCM15]. This makes it to
one of the most interesting implementations of an electronic voting system. But there
are still unsolved security problems and the system’s usability is generally very bad. It is
difficult to explain to a typical voter, what the different kinds of credentials types are for.
Civitas is also the first system which was from scratch designed for maximum distribu-
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Civitas
Authentication Multiple types of credentials (fake / real)
Voting Policy Different vote policies possible
App Structure Java application
Distributed Yes, except the bulletin board
Development Model Open source
Encryption Scheme ElGamal
Ballot Anonymity Verifiable re-encryption mix
Tallying Process Anonymized ballots are decrypted and published
Voter Verifiability Yes
Universal Verifiability Yes, published ballots and ZKPs for all steps
Table 4.6: Summary of Civitas
tion of its parts as it is based on JCJ [JCJ05]. All parts can be multiplied and distributed
on different servers and locations, except the bulletin board. But there is no active de-
velopment in Civitas; the last update was released in 2008. Therefore, Civitas can be
considered as a proof-of-concept for a distributed voting system and parts of it can be
used as a base for the development of an own system.
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4.6 Comparison
Now that we have a brief overview of the most important voting systems, we can directly
compare them:
Estonia DVBM Norway iVote Civitas
Authentication eID Postal MinID Postal Postal
Voting Policy Multiple Single Multiple Single Multiple
Application Structure App PDF / Web App Web App
Distributed Partly Partly Partly Unknown Yes
Development Model Partly Open Closed Closed Closed Open
Encryption Public Key Public Key ElGamal ElGamal ElGamal
Ballot Anonymity Partly Unknown Yes Unknown Yes
Tallying Process Decrypted and tallied
Voter Verifiability Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Universal Verifiability No No Partly No Yes
Table 4.7: Comparing the Systems
4.6.1 Interpretation
At first we notice that there are some unknown features of the voting systems. These
mostly come due to the lack of a sufficient documentation. Especially, the Ballot Anonymity
is not well described in two of five systems, but this is one of the most critical issues in a
voting system. If a voter can not trust that her vote is anonymous, she could not trust in
the system.
It is conspicuous that each system tries to fulfill the preliminaries on their own way.
Mostly, they only agree in the tallying process. Voting systems used in big elections, are
only partly distributed. This means that there are often different machines for different
tasks (firewall, authentication server, mix-net servers, etc.), but they are all deployed in
one data center, which makes them vulnerable against DDoS attacks and this risks the
availability.
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Authentication Estonia provides the easiest authentication method, since it uses their
eID cards, whose technique is well known and understood. Norway tries to go a similar
way with MinID. The other systems use the postal mail, because this is assumed to be
the easiest and most trustworthy way to provide the eligible users their credentials.
Voting Policy Most systems rely on multiple votes. This is natural, since this is the
easiest way to make coercion much more difficult and less effective. But no system
provides a complete secure solution against coercion.
Application Structure Since web-techniques are powerful enough, native and web
applications are equally used. As long as the developers deploy the application for the
common operating systems and mobile devices, the eligible voters are able to access the
application and can therefore participate in the election. But native applications are not
as easy to use as web applications, because they need to be distributed to the eligible
citizens and then installed.
Encryption Scheme Three out of five analyzed systems use ElGamal as their encryp-
tion scheme, but none of them use the homomorphic addition of the ciphertexts, because
the homomorphic aggregation of the ballot takes a long time and much computing power
(see subsection 3.3.2). ElGamal is often used because of the possibility to use threshold
encryption or the re-encryption property.
The ballots of these systems are decrypted and then tallied the “normal” way. One
reason is the computational power needed to directly tally the ballots on their cipher-
texts [CCM08]. Therefore, they are first decrypted and then counted and not directly
aggregated on their ciphertexts.
Ballot Anonymity This is a critical part: In three out of our five systems, it is either
unknown or not sufficiently guaranteed that the ballots are anonymized. These flaws are a
relevant criterion for exclusion of these systems, since they do not fill the most important
preliminary for a voting system: to keep the voter’s choice reliably anonymous.
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Voter and Universal Verifiability Most systems provide the possibility to verify the
voter’s ballot, but the system’s tallying processes are not completely verifiable. Only the
Norwegian system provides zero-knowledge-proofs to verify the mix-net.
4.6.2 Summary
None of the analyzed real-world system fulfills all preliminaries defined in chapter 2.
Nevertheless, these preliminaries are essential for a secure, anonymous and verifiable
voting system. This is not satisfying for critical elections and we can already say at
this point that currently implemented voting systems are not sufficient for parliamentary
elections.
It seems that some implemented voting systems ignored the research and experiences,
which other systems prior to them had. We can just pick South Wales iVote, which
started the most recent state election in 2015. It looks like they tried to reinvent elec-
tronic voting and implement many things differently compared to older voting systems.
Some major flaws are that they completely ignore coercion, enable vote-selling, do not
document the election’s process and provide no universal verifiability.
The Norwegian system and iVote are developed by the same Spanish electronic voting
company Scytl. Since the Norwegian system was developed before iVote, this company
should have the experiences to know better how to reduce coercion or even how to im-
plement a mix-net for reliable anonymization of the ballots. We discuss this later in
section 6.2.
4.7 Other Systems and Schemes
The system of this chapter is only a small collection of existing e-voting systems. There
are several theoretical schemes or systems for low-coercion elections, but most of them
lack of good usability or are too complicated and are therefore just used as a proof-of-
concept.
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4.7.1 Helios
Helios is a web-based voting system developed for small elections, like a student’s par-
liament in a university [Adi08]. It provides no mechanisms against coercion and could
therefore not be used in parliamentary elections, which is the reason why it appears in this
section. The complete application is open source and the credentials are sent via email
to the voters. Good practices are taken into concern and are correctly implemented, e.g.
ElGamal is used and the ballots are shuffled and re-encrypted in a mix net.
All steps are verifiable; the cast votes, ZKPs of the mix-net, shuffled votes, decrypted
votes and the proofs-of-correct-decryption are published on a bulletin board.
Test-Audits against Ballot Modification A special feature of Helios is the possibility
for auditing the own vote. After composing the ballot, Alice can choose to send her
vote to the Helios servers or reveal the used random factors needed for encryption and
show the ballot’s content. This step is also possible on her local machine with a provided
Python script, whereas no Internet connection is needed and the ballot is destroyed after
the auditing process.
Being able to audit her vote makes it possible to verify that no malicious software has
modified her ballot. She can repeat these steps as often as she likes until she decides to
send the ballot to Helios. This mechanism makes it unlikely for a malicious program to
modify the ballot without noticing, since this program does not know if Alice casts her
vote or keeps it for auditing.
A voter has also the option to check if her vote was modified. Her encrypted ballot is
locally created and posted on the bulletin board combined with her name. Therefore, she
could compare the encrypted ballot from her device with the posted ballot on the bulletin
board and might reveal the modification of her vote.
These test-audits might be a good proof-of-concept to reveal modifications on the own
ballot, but are not usable in practice, which was the result of a usability analysis [KO11].
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4.7.2 Code Voting
Several e-voting systems follow a different approach for verification. These systems
belong are using Code Voting, which is an enhancement to the poll cards we already
saw in the Norwegian I-voting system in subsection 4.3.1. To vote, a ballot and a unique
code card are needed, whilst the coding card is shipped to the voter through an untappable
channel. The candidates on the ballot are shuffled and marked with a random number
and the coding card has a unique serial number. Extensions to this are more complex and
are coded into matrices. These coding cards are some kind of n×n matrices with a row
n for each candidate, where, for example, each row contains one cell with “yes” and all
n−1 remaining fields might be marked with “no” [KZ10].
If the ballot and the coding card are put side by side, she can mark the “yes” cell in the
row of the candidate she wants to vote for and one random “no” cell in the rows of the
other candidates. Giving the system her marks and the coding card’s serial number, the
system is able to tally her vote.
Each voter gets one ballot, but might have many coding cards. After she placed the
ballot, she can get a receipt, wherewith she can verify her vote afterwards. The receipt is
useless without the ballot and the correct coding card.
Popular systems using code voting achieve to provide end-to-end verifiability with this
new kind of receipts and coding cards. Some examples are Punchscan [PH09], Three-
Ballot [Riv04] or more advanced Scratch, Click & Vote [KZ10].
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Construction
Constructing an electronic voting system is a very complex task. High requirements for
integrity and anonymity do not allow a simple solution; each building block must be
well chosen. Real-world internet voting systems have shown that it is very easy to do
something wrong: Possible vote manipulation (see 4.1, 4.4) or dubious storing of the
votes (see 4.2) lead to low trust in electronic voting systems. This is comprehensible,
since poorly designed voting systems endanger the anonymity of the voter’s choice or
even threaten democracy through the possibility for an attacker to have an impact on the
election’s outcome.
With the analyzed systems in mind, we try to design a voting system which fulfills the
requirements. In the end we will show which issues can not be solved and need fur-
ther work to find a solution. We already described the assumptions for our system in
section 2.1 and add another assumption in subsection 5.1.1.
5.1 Registration and Authentication
As a first step, the voter needs to register for the election to get her credentials needed
for authentication. As we have seen in chapter 4, there basically exist two options: cre-
dentials via postal mail or an electronic ID card with a governmental controlled PKI.
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Since more and more countries are introducing electronic identity cards (eID), it is just
natural to think about using it for authentication in electronic voting systems. Govern-
ments with electronic ID cards control the electoral register and provide the public-key-
infrastructure needed for authentication with asymmetric cryptography (see 4.1).
This is a great starting point for our voting system, because the voter can authenticate
herself at the authentication servers and it is easily possible to look up the electoral reg-
ister to see if the voter is eligible to vote.
Furthermore, vote-buying becomes less relevant, since a voter would reconsider if she
sells her electronic identity, which might be used for several online services. Selling
some one-time-credentials for one specific election is much easier than giving up her
own identity manifested in the eID card. This is an example for expensive credentials,
which can be used for other services and are therefore more unlikely to be sold.
An alternative to the eID card are credentials sent via postal mail to the eligible voters.
These credentials can be of two different kinds: Firstly, they contain the codes to log
into the voting application and place the vote. But this would easily enable vote-buying.
Secondly, credentials could be sent to the voter giving her the option to register her own
public key, which also enables vote-buying as described in the previous paragraph. Ba-
sically, this could be as secure as the electronic ID card and has the advantage that the
voter can create the key-pair herself. However, both methods require a second trustwor-
thy channel and a trusty government-hosted PKI. Therefore, sending postal mails do not
provide any relevant advantages compared to eID and achieve the same level of trust,
which is why we chose a secure electronic ID card in our trust assumptions.
5.1.1 Assumption
Electronic ID cards are heavily discussed in the community and criticized for the general
practice and many possible security problems, like compromised systems with which an
attacker could access an eID when it is plugged into the card reader [Cha13]. But this
is not in the scope of this thesis. Therefore, we assume that we have trustworthy ID
cards and are able to securely authenticate at our e-voting application with a secure
(government-managed) PKI.
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This also makes the registration dispensable, because of the governmental managed PKI,
the voting system can verify the eligibility with the data from the eID card or with an
API request to a server provided by the government containing the electoral register.
5.1.2 Using eID cards
From the real world systems, the Estonian one seems to be most advanced. They are
actually using their eID cards to authenticate at the voting system, as we described in
section 4.1. This is one of the easiest solutions for authentication, since the citizens are
already familiar with this technique.
Most other systems assume that there exists at least one untappable channel (a secure
channel, where messages can be sent without attackers having the possibility to eaves-
drop or manipulate the content), which they use to send credentials to each eligible citi-
zen. In times of mass-surveillance it is questionable if there really exist some untappable
channels like the postal mail (which is often assumed), but with eID cards we can skip
this channel and use a secured connection in the Internet to connect and authenticate at
the voting application.
If there are no PKI and eIDs provided by the government, the voters should be able to get
their credentials from an authority which they can personally visit, identify themselves
and get the credentials for the election. Sending them via postal mail might be another
option, but we are sceptical that this is really a trustworthy channel, since the Snowden
leaks proved that the NSA tracks the snail mail in the USA [Hil13].
5.2 Coercion Freeness
Depending on the building block chosen for the authentication, the susceptibility for
coercion can be estimated. For example, it is easier for someone to sell her credentials,
which are only needed for this election, than to give the complete own electronic identity
to a coercer, because with the eID the coercer might be able to sign documents in the
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voter’s name but for his behalf or similar. What we try to achieve in the voting systems
is coercion-freeness.
As already described in the preliminaries, an e-voting system must be coercion-free. This
means for a voting system that a voter must not be able to prove to the coercer how she
voted. In our opinion, the definition of coercion should include that even network attack-
ers are not able to show that the voter placed her ballot or not. This stricter definition of
coercion seems natural, since we know that network- or ISP-level attacks are possible.
Resultant problems are that this observer can force groups of voters simply not to vote,
e.g. because this group of people is known for always voting for party A. This kind of
attack is currently not considered by most voting systems, because there were no such
attacks documented as far as we know.
Some modern electronic voting systems allow multiple votes in their policies to reduce
coercion (see 4.1.2, 4.3.1). This way, the voter is able to place a new ballot which revokes
the old one, which is an easy to use and easy to understand approach against coercion.
The developers of Civitas chose a different way and give the voter the option to create
fake credentials, wherewith the voter can vote in the presence of a coercer (see 4.5.4).
A complete, and still usable, protection against coercion is currently not available. Cur-
rent implementations provide only basic protection against vote-buying and parts of co-
ercion.
5.2.1 Coercion Evidence
One of these theoretical approaches is the idea of coercion-evidence: if a certain amount
of ballots are being revoked, the election is supposed to be compromised and should
therefore be closed [GRBR13]. The authors of this evidence assume that not too many
voters use double voting to revoke their first choice as long as they are not being coerced.
But if a defined threshold is reached, there must be a coercer compromising the election
and has a big enough impact on the outcome. This threshold should be chosen as the
minimum amount of votes needed to change the distribution of the seats in a parliament,
for example.
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5.2.2 Reducing Coercion
The theoretical approach of coercion-evidence can easily be integrated in existing voting
systems providing the possibility to replace their votes. Depending on factors we de-
scribed in 5.2.1, the election officials should define an appropriate threshold.
Combined with existing practices as they are used in Estonia, Norway or Civitas, the of-
ficials get an easy instrument to estimate the trustworthiness of the election’s outcome.
We suggest to allow multiple votes for an election, whilst the last ballot counts and the
paper ballot also overrides the electronic ballots. Combined with a meaningful thresh-
old, the system gets an easy-to-use estimation mechanism to evaluate, when an election
is possibly coerced. Also the suggested use of expensive credentials, like the eID, make
it unlikely that the eligible voter might sell her vote as described in 5.1.
Further research is needed in this point to develop a more secure approach against coer-
cion. We discuss this later in 6.3.1.
5.3 Application Architecture
As we have defined how to register and authenticate, we can now describe how the ap-
plication could look like and which blocks from existing systems can be taken.
Real-world voting systems are realized in two ways: as a web application, where the
voter directly connects with her own browser to the application, or with native software
products the voter needs to download before the election begins.
5.3.1 Web Application
Deploying it as a normal website has obviously the advantage that a user does not need to
download and install software. Web technologies, like JavaScript, are powerful enough
to locally encrypt the ballots in the browser and then transfer it to the server. Therefore,
it is possible to create a complete web-based application.
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5.3.2 Native Applications
A native application can easily be verified via a checksum after downloading it, which
ensures the integrity (provided that it is possible to get the official, unchanged checksum
from a trusted source). Then the election officials can ship the election’s keys or similar
needed credentials directly with the application.
The checksum itself is not a complete protection against infected software, but as long as
a secure cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA2) is used, we can assume that integrity
is granted.
5.3.3 Web vs. Native Applications
Since man-in-the-middle attacks are likely in the Internet [TA15] and web servers have
many weaknesses [DAM+15], it appears to be more secure to provide a native applica-
tion, but these applications are also provided through the Internet. Given that the users
verify their software with the checksum, we can be sure that the provided keys are the
correct ones needed for the election. That is the Estonian way to prepare an election.
They develop software for all big platforms and describe very well on their websites how
this software can be used.
The biggest problem in this part is that the typical user does not verify the downloaded
application with the checksum or even knows how to do this.
One problem is that this native software is mostly provided via the Internet and com-
mon web servers. So, there exist the same problems in distributing the software via the
Internet compared to the direct access at a web application.
Both approaches have advantages and drawbacks dependent on their implementations.
Since the distribution of a web application is more easy and no installation is needed on
the voter’s device, we suggest to design a web application.
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5.4 Distributed Infrastructure
Each presented system, which was used for big political elections, is centralized in one
data center (as far as we know). There are mostly several servers for dedicated tasks, e.g.
for the firewall or the voting application. But as some attacks have shown, when one of
these servers gets compromised by an attacker, usually she has control over the complete
election or sufficient access to the ballots [WWIH10,HT15]. In this scenario, taking over
one server is enough to have a great impact on the results of an election. Even applying
a DDoS attack will use the full capacity of the server, which is the target of this attack
and it might heavily reduce the availability of the voting servers. But availability is a
preliminary for an election (see chapter 2).
The only nearly complete distributed system we described in chapter 4, is Civitas (see 4.5).
Each task needed for the election is separated in the source code and can be deployed on
different machines, no matter where they are located.
Advantages of Distributed Systems
“A distributed system is a collection of independent computers that appear
to the users of the system as a single computer” (Andrew Tanenbaum, 1994)
This quote describes very well what we try to achieve for the architecture of a voting
system: Invisible in the front end, distributed in the back end. Distribution leads to a
better availability and reliability, because of the simple fact that there are more servers
serving the application. It can also be faster than a single server structure, since the
requests can be load-balanced and it scales more easily.
Availability is a very important preliminary for a voting system, because a system is
worthless if it can not be accessed. Therefore, we must protect electronic voting sys-
tems against a lack of availability, which is nowadays mostly caused by DDoS attacks.
Distributed servers are more robust against this common attack and provide a higher re-
liability than centralized solutions.
Naturally, the developers should also consider to use crypto-puzzles, since this is also a
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good protection against DDoS attacks, but distributing the servers is also necessary to
keep the voting system reliably online.
Distributed servers have also the advantage that the security increases, because the voter
does not need to rely on exactly one server, which might have been compromised. Instead
it might be possible to choose the ballot box, which provides a sense of security to her.
Details about the infrastructure of the described systems are often not publicly available.
But while designing a voting system, it should be considered to distribute and replicate
it over multiple machines in different data centers to gain the advantages shortly
described in 5.4.
Distributing the servers into several locations is one possibility to achieve these goals.
But since the invention of Bitcoin, there is also another approach, which is heavily dis-
cussed in the community: a blockchain.
5.5 Different Approach: A Blockchain
With the help of a distributed database, called blockchain, it might be possible to build
a peer-to-peer voting system which does not need servers controlled by the government
and distributes most of the trust and computational power needed for the election to
volunteers. These volunteers can be anyone, who want to support the election. The more
people are supporting, the more secure becomes a blockchain.
This database was first presented in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamato as the basic element the
Bitcoin protocol was built upon [Nak08]. Currently, the Bitcoin protocol is used for
the biggest peer-to-peer based payment system and was developed as an alternative to
conventional money, which is centralized and regulated, whilst Bitcoin is not.
56
5.5 Different Approach: A Blockchain
5.5.1 Definition: Blockchain
A blockchain is a distributed database, where the complete data is shared between all
participants in the network. Data, which is supposed to be stored in this database, is
packed into packages with a defined maximum size and verified with a specific hash.
This hash must begin with a certain number of zeros, which depends on the number of
participants in the network. To achieve this, the participants add a nonce to the packed
data and try to find the correct hash by modifying the nonce. This proof-of-work is called
mining. Mining is used to generate new Bitcoins. A discoverer, who found the correct
hash for some packets, is granted some Bitcoins. The amount of these granted coins is
controlled by the Bitcoin protocol and it takes about ten minutes to discover a new hash.
Data in the Bitcoin protocol is represented as transactions between two or more users.
Since all transactions are public, each user knows the current amount of Bitcoins of all
users. Before the transactions are added to the blockchain, the inputs of the transactions
are checked and it is ensured that these inputs have not been spent before. This verifi-
cation is possible due to the public transactions stored in a blockchain and it prevents
double spending of the coins.
Volunteers can participate in the network in two ways:
1. Set up a full node, which means to have the complete blockchain locally stored.
These nodes verify the hashes of the blocks, which ensures the blockchain’s in-
tegrity. They also exchange the blockchain among themselves to keep a common
state. It is necessary to have an active Internet connection to participate.
2. Miners collect new transactions and find new hashes to generate new blocks. If a
hash is discovered, it is spread in the network and can be verified by the full nodes.
This is the general idea behind a blockchain and the first protocol using it. As it is open
source, developers can use different approaches to verify the blocks which should be
stored in the database and you can also choose a different proof for this verification. A
better suiting proof for voting systems is presented in subsection 5.5.3.
In the Bitcoin protocol, a blockchain is used to store the transactions between the users.
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Each user has a private wallet and is able to buy Bitcoins, which she can then spend. All
transactions are publicly available, starting with the genesis block, which is the first block
ever mined. The next block is appended to the genesis block, the third to the second one
and so on. This creates a long chain of blocks, which is then called blockchain.
It is possible to append the new found block to the blockchain wherever the user likes,
but the protocol’s design defines that the longest chain is the “true” chain. Smaller chains
are ignored. Combined with a timestamp and the proof-of-work, this prevents double-
spending.
5.5.2 Advantages of a Blockchain
A blockchain has several advantages, which make it a robust and secure alternative to
other databases:
• Completely distributed with many nodes storing the complete database.
⇒ high availability
• Each block is verified and appended to the blockchain. Therefore, it is hard to
alter an older value in the chain, since all following blocks have to be recalculated,
which needs much computational power due to the proof-of-work. This is also
why double-spending is unlikely.
⇒ verifiability and integrity
• Easy to define one common starting point, where to store the data – always append
it to the last block in the longest chain.
These advantages make a blockchain attractive to be used as the database in an electronic
voting system, because it already provides a mechanism to fulfill some of our prelimi-
naries.
Compare a Blockchain with a typical peer-to-peer Application Consider a peer-to-
peer voting system, where all transactions are distributed among all online nodes. The
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nodes have equal roles, since we are thinking about a voting system without the need
of governmental controlled super nodes. How are new votes handled? Typically, they
are somehow broadcasted into the network, depending on the underlying routing policy.
But since the nodes do not know all participants in the network, it is not possible for
them to directly broadcast the ballot. Therefore, other nodes are needed to handle the
new transaction and to forward it to their neighbors, hoping that the ballot arrives at all
nodes. This is not likely, since malicious nodes or nodes, which go offline, might not
forward the ballot. Eclipse attacks are also possible, which prevent the data exchange
of one specific node by placing malicious nodes in strategical good positions, which can
then compromise the routing and distributing the data.
This leads to the problem that all nodes have a different number of ballots locally stored
and a common starting point can not easily be found.
Ballots which are broadcasted into the network, are also not verified and can be spread
across the complete network without big effort. This leads to an uncontrolled flood of
ballots, whereby each active node keeps a different state.
These are some problems that can be solved with a blockchain, since many ballots are
packed into one block, which are first verified and then appended to the blockchain.
The proof-of-work for each block ensures integrity of the ballots, because of the crypto-
puzzle, which needs to be solved. Also, the definition that the longest chain is the current
state of the database, makes it easy to solve this issue.
So, a blockchain solves two major problems when designing a peer-to-peer network with
a distributed database: maintaining one common state of the database and the integrity
of the database.
5.5.3 Voting in a Blockchain
This approach is pretty interesting for electronic voting systems, because it is secure,
reliable, completely verifiable and distributed. And the computational power needed to
verify the ballots, is distributed among all participants, who want to contribute to the
system.
There are already some organizations trying to build a peer-to-peer based voting system
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with a blockchain, like VoteCoin [Vot15] or BitCongress [Bit15b], but their websites are
partially under construction and they have nothing published explaining their concept
in detail; they only advertise the blockchain-approach, but do not explicitly present their
ideas. Therefore, we can not analyze how they use a blockchain for voting. This might be
the case because of many problems a blockchain has when it comes to voting, which we
want to discuss briefly, when we try to describe a simple blockchain voting protocol.
Design
Two approaches are thinkable: designing our own blockchain protocol or using one big
and stable protocol, like Bitcoin. For now, we define our own protocol and call it Ballot-
Coin, which can be used to cast one vote for a candidate. This is more appropriate, since
we want to use a different proof to verify the ballots. If we would decide to implement it
directly into the Bitcoin network, it would produce more problems like non-fitting proof-
of-works or the unpredictable progression of the Bitcoin price, since it would heavily
increase, when a government buys many Bitcoins.
Let us transfer the elements of a voting system to a blockchain-based voting system.
Authentication and Registration Each candidate and eligible voter needs her own
private wallet. The voters should be able to create their own wallets and register them
at some place to verify their eligibility. After the registration, the voter must receive a
BallotCoin to place her vote.
Setting up the Election The election’s officials have to define the candidates and set
up the election. One address of each candidate must be publicly available, where the
voter should transfer her BallotCoin to. Ideally, this is nicely packed into one application,
so a user only has to click on the candidate she wants to vote for.
Voting Process Voting for a candidate is related to a transaction in the Bitcoin pro-
tocol: the voter sets up a transaction transferring her BallotCoin to the wallet of the
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candidate. The amount of BallotCoins in the wallet of each candidate is the result of the
election.
Transferring the BallotCoin to an address not belonging to a candidate should be prohib-
ited. By this way, only real votes are stored into the blockchain.
Verifiability The general idea of a blockchain defines that all transactions are public.
This means that each user can see if her vote has arrived in the candidate’s wallet. Also,
all other transactions can be verified this way to reconstruct the results of the election.
Problems
The idea of distributing the complete voting process and making it verifiable for everyone
is very interesting. But there are several problems in this design of a voting protocol.
Coercion and Receipt Freeness All transactions are public in a blockchain. This
means that a voter has a receipt of her vote: she knows her own address and can prove to
a coercer to which address she transferred her BallotCoin. Therefore, this receipt enables
coercion.
Moreover is re-voting not possible in this approach, because each voter only has exactly
one BallotCoin. A possible solution would be to transfer multiple coins to each eligible
voter and subtract double votes when the election ended.
Fairness Partial results should not be allowed in a voting system (see chapter 2). This
could influence voters who have not voted yet, since they are more likely to vote for one
of the parties which have currently more votes. These voters might recognize that the
small party they might vote for has no chance to get a seat in the parliament; her vote
would then be wasted.
As long as a blockchain is publicly available during the election, fairness is broken and
this should not be the case in a parliamentary election. This broken preliminary is suffi-
cient not to use the blockchain approach for voting.
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Proof-of-Work not suitable A typical proof-of-work, like in the Bitcoin protocol, is
not suitable for a blockchain voting protocol, because mining needs much computational
power and thus monetary resources to find the correct hash. It is also thinkable that or-
ganizations with complete data centers or mining pools use their superior computational
power to find the correct hashes faster than other volunteers. This is a problem, because
if a mining pool has the power to provide 51% of the network’s computational power, it
is very likely that this pool discovers most of the hashes. So, they can define the longest
chain, since they decide where to append the block to construct the longest chain. This
is called 51-percent-attack, which enables double spending of the BallotCoins and en-
dangers the integrity of the blockchain, because one pool has a too high impact on the
generation of the blocks [Hob13]. In 2014, the Bitcoin mining pool GHash.io reached
51% of the networks hash-rate and was theoretically capable of unobtrusively manipu-
lating the blockchain of Bitcoin [Coi14]. They announced to reduce their hash-rate to
preserve the blockchain’s integrity.
We have to think about another proof, which is needed to secure the ballots in a blockchain.
Modified Proof-of-Stake One approach could be the proof-of-stake, which is already
used in several Bitcoin-alternatives like Peercoin [KN12] or Nextcoin (Nxt) [Nxt15].
The main difference is that the power to verify new blocks in a blockchain depends on
the amount of coins you have in your wallet. The total number of coins is fixed in these
systems and you earn money with transaction fees.
We focus on the Nextcoin protocol, since it provides a quite usable proof-of-stake, which
we modify in the next paragraph to make it suitable for a voting system.
Let us assume there exist 100 Nxt coins in our network and we own one Nxt coin. Each
minute, a random node is picked by the Nxt protocol and selected as the next miner
for the new block. If this node is connected to the Nxt network, it can forge a new
block. If not, another node is randomly chosen. Forging a block means to collect open
transactions, make a new block, receive the transaction fees and spread the new block to
the complete network. To increase the probability of being picked as the new miner, it is
sufficient to increase the number of coins we have in our wallet. We assumed to own 1
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of 100 Nxt coins, so the probability of being picked is:
Nxt coins we own
total number of Nxt coins in the network =
1
100 = 1% (5.1)
Therefore, we have a 1% chance of being picked by the network to forge the new block.
Application of the Modified Proof-of-Stake in BallotCoin In our BallotCoin proto-
col, the number of coins each eligible voter possesses should not matter. So, the chances
of being picked is equally distributed between the eligible voters. To guarantee the in-
tegrity of our blockchain, we need some full nodes staying online during the election.
These nodes verify existing blocks in the chain and might get picked by the network to
forge the new block of ballots. The picked node has then the task to verify the new bal-
lots before they are appended to the blockchain. If many nodes are online, it is unlikely
for a malicious node to get picked, which also secures the network.
Since we left computational power behind us to secure our blockchain and to keep its in-
tegrity, it is also possible for small devices to be a BallotCoin node. This means that even
smartphones and tablets can be used to forge new blocks, given that they have the Bal-
lotCoin application installed, an active Internet connection and enough space to store the
blockchain. Scanning the network for new ballots and creating a new block is an easy
task, which can be handled with their small processors. Therefore, a volunteer in the
election could just keep the application running to support the election without spending
more money than she is used to.
Calculating the disk usage of the BallotCoin blockchain To estimate the disk usage
of the blockchain in a e-voting system, we focus on the Estonian parliamentary elections
in 2015, because this country already provides reliable statistics about the eligible vot-
ers and the percentage of voters already using their I-voting system. We focus on these
statistics from their most recent election for the calculation below [The15].
A typical small transaction (1 sender, 1 receiver, no transaction fees) in the Bitcoin net-
work is about 200 bytes long [Bit15a]. In the last Estonian election were 176,329 I-votes
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counted, which lead to this estimated disk usage for the transactions:
200 bytes ·176,329 = 35,265,800 bytes ≈ 33.6 MiB (5.2)
We have to add some overhead for the hashes for each package of transactions, but this
will not heavily increase the calculated disk usage. Therefore, if the blockchain would
have been used in Estonia in the last election, the disk usage for all transactions could
have been about 33.6 MiB. Since smartphones have several gigabytes of internal storage,
this should not be a problem for most devices.
Estonia is a very small country compared to e.g. Germany with 64,4 million eligible
voters [Sta14]. Therefore, such an election would yield in Germany a much higher disk
usage. But we have no statistics of the amount of voters using the electronic voting
system, which is why we rely on Estonia in this example.
Attackers and the Proof-of-Stake As all nodes are assumed to be equally qualified to
forge new blocks, an attacker needs to compromise many eligible voters or buy their iden-
tities to set up many malicious nodes. But as long as a high number of volunteers actively
participate in the network (i.e. by being a full node), an attacker needs to have a huge
amount of these malicious nodes to have an impact on the integrity of the blockchain.
This is not impossible, but it is very costly, since an attacker needs many nodes to have a
high probability of being picked.
It is uncertain whether enough citizens participate in the network to secure the network,
because we do not believe that enough voters stay online during an election to reduce the
probability for an attacker to get picked for forging. As long as we have not implemented
this peer-to-peer system, we can not say for sure how this electronic voting system is
accepted by the votership.
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5.5.4 Summary
A blockchain might be an approach to secure electronic voting. But there are nearly the
same problems the centralized voting systems also have, whilst the biggest issues are
receipt-freeness, the resulting vulnerability against coercion and fairness.
We found no e-voting systems, which follow a peer-to-peer approach except the two
companies described in 5.5.3, but they do not provide any source code or concepts of
possible designs.
For now, there are too many issues to provide a fully functional blockchain voting system,
which fulfills all preliminaries. But it is still a great idea to distribute the complete voting-
and tallying-process over the whole range of eligible voters.
Therefore, we should keep an eye on this development, but for our constructed system we
suggest to use different locations and redundant servers to distribute the voting system
as described in section 5.4.
5.6 Logging Events
All events should be logged on a log server. These events include for example:
• New ballot: when a new ballot is placed, create an anonymized entry
• Transferring data: when data is transferred between servers
• Log in: when someone tries to log in
• Other interesting interactions
This is a mechanism to monitor the data and traffic between the servers or to a server.
Attacks might be revealed with this server even when the attacker is inside the data
center. At least this creates a trail if the election has been compromised, e.g. when an
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unusual behavior is observed. Then the election’s authorities can cancel the election or
take further steps.
Restricted access to the logging server is essential. It must be ensured that an attacker is
not able to compromise the logging server. Otherwise manipulation of the logs is likely,
which hides possible manipulation of the ballots.
The log server should not contain sensible entries. Otherwise the entries can not be
published, because the log entries would reveal too much of the private information of
the voters.
Estonia implements this for their Vote Forwarding Server when the ballots are moved to
the Vote Storage Server. Both of these servers keep a log on the Log Server documenting
what happens with the ballots during the election. Since this is a low expense mechanism,
a dedicated log server should be implemented, because it increases the possibility to
reveal attacks and keeps track of the ballot’s movements inside the voting system itself.
5.7 Development Model
Following an open source philosophy might have a big impact on the trustworthiness
or security of a voting system, which is described below. Both development models,
namely open source and closed source real-world voting systems, are used and provide
different problems and advantages.
5.7.1 Closed Source
Some systems, like the South Wales iVote (see 4.4) or parts of the Estonian system
(see 4.1), do not publish their source code. The maintainers of the Estonian system
justify themselves that it would be too easy to copy the complete system and set up a
malicious one. Halderman et al. took the open source parts of this system and reverse
engineered binary scripts, which were closed source, to build a working copy for testing
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purposes [HHK+14]. This copy nearly looked like the original system and had the same
functionality, although some parts of the source code were not published.
Since it is not possible to review the code, obvious security issues cannot easily be ex-
ploited. It is indeed a bit more complicated to reconstruct the software and build a copy
of it, but this might not stop an attacker since it is still not too complicated to recreate the
interface of an application.
5.7.2 Open Source
Many other systems, like D.C. Digital-Vote-by-Mail (see 4.2) or Civitas, decided to make
their code publicly available. This is a big step towards transparency, since everybody is
able to comprehend each step of the election or even set up her own mock election.
Popular open source applications have the advantage that the community is willed in re-
viewing and analyzing the code. In the case of electronic voting systems, many research
groups, like Halderman et al., are also very interested in investigating the system’s struc-
ture and security. With the support of volunteers, many security issues can be reported
and solved. This leads to a more secure software design.
In the first prototype of DVBM, the research group around Wolchok was able to com-
promise this system because of a simple bug in the code, which was supposed to read the
PDF file used as a ballot [WWIH10].
5.7.3 Summary
Therefore, open source enables inspecting the code prior to an election to find critical
security issues, which might have been found or exploited by an attacker in the real
election. It is also useful to publish the code for verification and setting up her own
voting system to find critical issues and reporting them prior the election. This will
preserve attacks like they were possible in the first phase of iVote or DVBM and should
therefore be used for a voting system.
The philosophy of Civitas is the way to go. All parts of the software are published and
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documented. The Estonian system is also a good example, but for the overall trans-
parency they should make it completely open source. Our suggestion is then to open
source the complete application to make it accessible for the community and research
groups.
5.8 Anonymous Communication
The infrastructure and the general design philosophy are now defined. As a next step, we
need to think about how to connect to the voting system, without risking that an attacker
might listen to or manipulate the communication between the voter and the election’s
servers.
When designing an electronic voting system, we must provide an untappable channel for
the complete communication between voter and server to prevent attackers to observe the
traffic (see 4.1.5). This channel must be indistinctive from the normal traffic. Otherwise
it is trivial for an observer to verify that the observed sends requests to the voting server,
when only these requests are exclusively sent through this anonymous channel.
Low-Latency-Networks and Timing Attacks Some voting systems suggest Tor1 or
similar software for the untappable channel. But for network attackers it is easy to run
timing attacks [EH96] and analyze this traffic to see if a voter voted or not and low-
latency networks like Tor are no protection against it. In our paper [SMHM15] we were
able to show that it is already sufficient to observe the traffic of the ballot boxes and some
coerced persons to make it very likely to prove, whether the voter placed her ballot and
stayed away of the election or not. Assumed we know the typical traffic-pattern when
placing a ballot, then this timing attack is enabled. We discuss this in subsection 6.3.1.
It is a non-deniable possibility to coerce a complete group of voters.
If Tor or a similar low-latency network is exclusively used to cast a vote, it is trivial to
see if an observed user connected to the voting server, because this will be the only traffic
passing an anonymous network.
1https://www.torproject.org
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High-Latency-Networks On the other hand, there exist high-latency-networks, where
packets travel long time from client to server. This will eliminate timing attacks, but
is unpractical for an electronic voting system, because the user directly needs feedback
if her vote was counted and not some minutes later. Placing the vote without getting
feedback even might decrease trust into the system. Therefore, the untappable channel
should not be implemented through a system with too high latency as it is common in
high-latency-networks.
Current Approaches
Current voting systems do mostly not provide an own untappable channel. Some theoret-
ical systems try to build their own mix-nets, but since coercion starts with the connection
to the server (the voter might not have placed her ballot up to this point), this is not a
sufficient protection against network-level attackers. A normal user does not use anony-
mous networks, whereby it would be suspicious and detectable if she uses a network like
Tor just for the voting process.
It is an open question how to hide from network-level attackers and is not in the scope
of this thesis. Currently, there are no approaches to solve this issue and since low-latency
and high-latency networks alike seem not applicable it is questionable, whether there is
a solution at all.
5.9 Ballots
We described the registration, general architecture and the communication between voter
and server. Now it is important to focus on the ballots themselves, since they are essential
for an election.
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5.9.1 Composition
Ballots can be encrypted and have different data structures or properties based on the
chosen cryptographic scheme. We will now present our ideas for the ballot’s composi-
tion.
Is encryption really needed for the ballots?
To put it briefly: yes. Encryption is essential, since it keeps the ballot’s content private
even if an attacker has access to the encrypted ballot; she is still not able to see for whom
the voter made her sign. This ensures privacy of the voter’s choice.
Additionally, the voting system should require a signature by the voter to ensure the
ballot’s integrity. It is signed with the voter’s private key from her personal eID card,
which can be later used for verification.
Also a timestamp should be added to the signature for internal use to make it possible to
sort the ballots and to discard old ballots.
Ballots must be secured and safely stored. If the voter does not trust in it, the system
will not have any chances to be accepted. Missing trust in the system is one reason why
the Norwegian system was shut down and the trial of internet voting was cancelled in
2014 [Min14]. This underlines the importance of this point.
During the design process of a voting system, we have to choose which encryption to
use. Due to the general architecture of the problem, it seems natural to use some kind of
asymmetric encryption, because we want to encrypt the ballot in a way, where only one
specific authority is able to decrypt it. Now, if we think one step further, we have to keep
in mind that we need to reliably anonymize the ballots before the tallying process, as it
is described in subsection 5.9.3.
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Homomorphic Encryption
To support mix-nets, it is necessary to choose a cryptographic primitive, which sup-
ports re-encryption. Otherwise mix-nets make no sense and provide no useful contribu-
tion for anonymity (see 3.4). As we suggest to use mix-nets for the ballot anonymiza-
tion (see 5.9.3), we have to use a homomorphic encryption scheme which supports re-
encryption. So, we suggest to use a homomorphic encryption scheme for the election’s
key-pair.
Threshold Encryption
Some encryption schemes support threshold encryption (see 3.5). Distributing the private
key, which is needed to decrypt the ballots, ensures that more than one authority needs to
be compromised to decrypt the ciphertexts. Threshold encryption should be used, since
this makes it harder for an attacker to get the ballot’s content. Additionally, corruption is
unlikely, because more than just one authority needs to be corrupted to get the key.
Since we suggested a homomorphic encryption scheme, it should support threshold
encryption, because it adds more trust into the authorities and makes it much more
difficult to corrupt authorities without noticing it. For maximum security all trustees of
the system should have to cooperate to reconstruct the private key, because even one
compromised trustee is enough to cancel the election.
Summary
To support threshold- and re-encryption, we suggest to use ElGamal as the chosen algo-
rithm for encryption. Libraries implementing ElGamal are developed for many program-
ming languages, like Python, where ElGamal is part of the Python Cryptography Toolkit
pycrypto2.
The election has to create an ElGamal key-pair with a sufficient secure key-length, whilst
2https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/blob/master/lib/Crypto/PublicKey/
ElGamal.py
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the public key is used by the voters to encrypt their ballot and the private key is distributed
with ElGamal’s threshold encryption property. A sufficient key-length depends on cur-
rent security standards. The NSA suggests in 2015 to use a minimum key-length of 3072
bits for their TOP SECRET documents [Blu15], which should also be applicable for the
ballots.
Additionally, the ballot’s integrity is ensured with the voter’s signature generated with
her eID card. When storing the ballots, a timestamp should be added to each ballot to
support multiple votes (see 5.2.2), because this timestamp enables sorting of the ballots
to keep only the most recent vote of a voter.
The threshold encrypted private key ensures anonymity of the ballots, because the elec-
tion’s private key must be reconstructed with the election’s trustees (see 3.5), which is
why nobody is able to decrypt the ballots before they are anonymized.
5.9.2 Filtering the Ballots
It is allowed to cast double votes to reduce coercion in this system. So, we have to keep
the most recent ballot from each voter and discard the others. Since each ballot has a
signature, we can verify which encrypted ballot belongs to whom. Then we can sort
them by their timestamps and simply keep the latest ballot. The timestamp should only
be used for internal use. Otherwise a coercer could be able to verify if a voter re-voted.
Modified ballots have a wrong signature and are not stored at all, because the verification
for the eligible voter would fail. But votes containing a correct signature with a malicious
or simply false input can not be detected in this step, since the private key is shared and
we had to decrypt the ciphertext to reveal the false input. Therefore, this must be done
shortly before the vote tally, where all ballots are decrypted one by one.
5.9.3 Anonymization of Ballots
The assumptions and suggested mechanics from this chapter limit the remaining crypto-
graphic primitives we can choose. For example, there exists currently no practical usage
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of blind signatures, when multiple votes are still allowed, because ballots with blind sig-
natures leave no trace to the voter. Therefore, it is not possible to assign the ballots to a
voter to keep only the most recent vote (see 3.7).
Since we suggested to enable multiple ballots, we need a different approach for the
anonymization of the ballots.
Voting systems which use homomorphic encryption, like the Norwegian or Civitas, rely
on mix-nets. This is trustworthy as long as at least one mix-server is not corrupt. After
each step of the mix-net, the ballots are re-encrypted and each mix-server then publishes
a ZKP to verify the mix and the re-encryption. Estonia does not seem to use mix-nets,
since they only describe that they strip off the signature from the ballots and leave a set
of anonymous votes [HHK+14].
In DVBM, the authenticated user has to download a PDF file and re-upload it to the web
server. There is no description about the anonymization process, but it is necessary, since
the voter adds at least meta information to the PDF file when she edits and saves it. The
maintainers only describe how the ballots are transferred to a non-networked computer,
which tallies the ballots, but there are no information about anonymization techniques.
Using Mix-Nets
As suggested in section 5.2, we choose multiple votes as the preferred way, since it dras-
tically reduces coercion. Therefore, blind signatures can not be used any more, because
this is not possible in combination with the multiple-votes-policy. So, we suggest to use
a mix-net as it provides a reliable mechanism to anonymize the ballots; it is very easy to
understand and all steps can be published for universal verifiability. To fulfill all crypto-
graphic requirements for a mix-net, our homomorphic encryption scheme must support
re-encryption.
After the mix-net, all ballots are anonymized and still encrypted, so that even the stored
ballots leave no connection to the voter.
Civitas and Norway already describe the correct usage of a mix-net. Therefore, we can
follow their implementations [CCM15].
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5.10 Tallying Process
When the voters placed their ballots and the election has ended, the next step will be to
collect all votes from the ballot boxes to tally the anonymized ballots.
Depending on the cryptographic primitives the system uses, there are different possibili-
ties to tally the ballots.
Asymmetric Encryption The ballots are encrypted with the election’s public key.
Therefore, each ballot needs to be first decrypted and can than be tallied. This is
a linear operation, because the computational time increases linear with the amount of
ballots.
Mathematical Operations on Ciphertexts Norway intends to use homomorphic ag-
gregation of the ballots, but does not use it yet, because the computational time needed
is too high. Basically, homomorphic aggregation is a great approach for voting sys-
tems since we can use the ciphertexts for mathematical computations. For optimization,
Gjøsteen tries to minimize the ballot’s ciphertext to get a speedup during the tallying
process [Gs13]. This might be useful, because this could heavily reduce the computing
time needed to apply the homomorphic property, but is currently not recommended due
to these reasons.
Tallying Server Before the tallying process starts, the ballot boxes have to merge the
votes and transfer them to a separate tallying server. Moreover, all zero-knowledge-
proofs and logs must also be transferred to enable verifiability and to check if any ballots
have been dropped or an insider might try to compromise the election. The tallying
server must be absolutely trustworthy, because this server is used to generate the private
key with the help of the trustees, to decrypt the ballots and then tally the result.
In Estonia, the tallying server is air-gapped to protect it against network attacks and
viruses. The ballots from the ballot boxes should be burned to a DVD and then inserted
into the tallying server, but in fact the administrators do not follow this rule and use their
own private USB sticks [HHK+14]. This is a problem as two scientists from Security
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Research Labs showed on the BlackHat conference in 2014 how to hack a USB stick and
let it inject malicious code into the operating system [ZEI14a]. Therefore, they can not
be sure that the USB sticks are not modified and using DVDs is the more secure way.
The tallying server must be secured and the guidelines for security of the developers
should be followed to reduce possible attacks on this essential server.
Proof-of-Correct-Decryption
No matter which encryption scheme is used, the correct decryption and tallying should be
verifiable. For this case, we can use a zero-knowledge-proof, which confirms the correct
decryption. This proof is called proof-of-correct-decryption and is described in [Abe00].
If the ballots are all correctly decrypted and verifiable, the authorities can start to sum
up the ballots. As a last step, the generated proofs should be published for verification.
These proofs guarantee that decrypted ballots show the intended content of the voter.
Since we chose homomorphic encryption in subsection 5.9.1, we have the possibilities
to decrypt the ballots one by one and tally the results. The decryption steps should be
made verifiable with ZKPs.
Ballot Validation
It is also necessary to validate the content of the ballots. Only in the last step, right
before the vote count, it is possible to catch false input. This should be only a few lines
of code, since the structure of a ballot is kept simple.
The ballot’s content must also be encoded to prevent malicious code probably being
executed on the e-voting servers.
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5.11 Voter Verifiability
After we described all steps from the registration to publishing the results, it is important
for a user to verify each step of the election, because this ensures trust in the system and
guarantees a correct result. First, we start with the verification of the voter’s own vote.
A voter must be able to verify that her vote was properly counted. This is analogous to
how it is done with paper ballots: the voter authenticates, gets an empty ballot, makes
her sign and puts it herself into the ballot box.
Equally, we need a mechanism in the electronic voting system which shows that the
ballot was correctly placed into the digital ballot box. This must be easy enough, so that
the typical voter is able to use this feature and verify that her own vote was counted.
There are different approaches for verification mentioned in chapter 4: Estonia uses a
separate smartphone application, which needs to scan a unique QR code directly dis-
played after the vote was placed (see 4.1.2). This requires that the voter has access to a
smartphone and that the Voting Application is already installed, because she might run
out of time to verify her vote; she has only 30 minutes to scan the QR code. It is ben-
eficial that no other credentials are needed and only the digital identity of the Estonian
citizen is sufficient. But a drawback of the temporary verifiability of the vote is that an
attacker just waits these 30 minutes and manipulates the ballot afterwards when it is no
longer possible to verify it (see Ghost Attack in subsection 4.1.5).
Norway has no eID and needs to send credentials via postal mail, which includes a
polling card with codes to compare them with the code she received via SMS right after
the ballot was placed (see 4.3.1). Similarly, iVote provides a receipt with a number on it,
with which she can verify her vote via telephone or Internet (see 4.4.1).
These systems rely on the voter’s (mobile) phone for verification. We think this might
have a positive impact on the acceptance of the system, because the user can try the new
way to vote and verify it with a trusted device, her mobile phone.
Since we suggested the trusted electronic ID, it is natural to verify the own vote with the
eID. This generates a receipt, but the voter gets a new receipt each time she places her
ballot, which makes it impossible for a coercer to see, if the presented receipt is for the
most recent ballot of the voter or for a discarded one. We will discuss this later in 6.3.2.
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5.12 Universal Verifiability and Publishing the Results
After the election ended and the tallying process finished, the results and the ZKPs for
each step should be published online. This way, everyone can verify the outcome of the
election.
It is sufficient to publish the outcome and all proofs of the tallying process, e.g. the proof-
of-correct-shuffling after each step of the mix-net and the proof-of-correct-decryption,
which verifies that all ballots were correctly counted after the mix-net [Abe00]. There-
fore, we suggest to publish all proofs for verification. These proofs and the voter ver-
ifiability makes our system an end-to-end verifiable e-voting system (see 2), because
all steps from placing the ballot up to the vote count are completely verifiable for the
voter.
Nearly no universal verifiability in common systems
In fact, the commonly used voting systems do hardly provide any options for universal
verifiability. Only Civitas publishes the anonymized ballots and the ZKPs on a bulletin
board. So, the outcome of an election for any of the real-world systems can not be
completely verified and the voter has to trust the election’s officials that they properly
tallied the ballots.
The Norwegian system added several zero-knowledge-proofs in their voting system, but
it is not well documented, if they are published or not. Basically, there are mechanisms to
provide ZKPs for the shuffling and re-encryption of the votes, which is at least a starting
point to universal verifiability.
Combining the transparency of Civitas and the good documentations the maintainers of
the Estonian voting system are used to provide, leads to a comprehensible tallying pro-
cess. Everyone would be able to verify the outcome with the published proofs, which
fulfills universal verifiability. In this step it is important to keep it simple: if the verifica-
tion of the election is too complicated, just few people will try to verify the election.
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5.13 Summary
To outline the content of this chapter, we can reduce it into one single table:
Suggested System Components
Authentication eID
Voting Policy Multiple votes
Coercion Reduced due to multiple votes and eID
App Structure Web
Distributed Multiple server locations
Development Model Completely open source
Anonymous Communication Not completely solved
Encryption Scheme Homomorphic with threshold-encryption
Ballot Anonymity Mix-net with re-encryption
Tallying Process Decrypt one by one
Voter Verifiability Time restricted verification
Universal Verifiability Publish ZKPs from 5.12
Table 5.1: Suggested Building Blocks of a Voting System
These are the building blocks of e-voting systems built with the cryptographic primitives
and techniques which are currently available and have been approved in real elections.
As we can see not all problems are sufficiently solved.
Also, we did not focus on common security mechanisms, for example intrusion detection
systems and firewalls. This leaves the scope of this thesis, but should not be forgotten
when deploying an electronic voting system.
The next step will be to evaluate these components to verify that they fulfill the pre-
liminaries or where are still problems, which need to be solved. This is described in
chapter 6.
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Evaluation
After the descriptions of some existing systems and the cherry-picking of their building
blocks for our own voting system, we now evaluate the system from chapter 5 against the
defined preliminaries from chapter 2. We will also focus on the weak points and analyze
them.
Since we designed our system with the preliminaries in mind and with the experiences
we gained from real-world systems, it is not surprising that our system fulfills many of
the requirements. Although we only have the theoretical construct of our system, we will
describe how we suggest to fulfill the preliminaries. For a qualified analysis, we should
implement our system, but this goes beyond the scope of this master thesis and needs
much more time.
6.1 Evaluate Constructed Voting System
At first we start with the preliminaries. Since they are essentially needed, it is absolutely
important to fulfill them.
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6.1.1 Eligibility
We assumed that the government controls a public-key-infrastructure and provides elec-
tronic ID cards for each citizen as it is done in Estonia or to some extent also in Germany
(see 5.1). With these eIDs it is very easy to determine if a voter is eligible to vote, since
this can be verified when she tries to login at the election’s authentication server. Two
ways are conceivable: on the one hand, the government could give a copy of the electoral
register to the election’s authorities and authenticate the voter. On the other hand, there
might be an API to query the state of the voter’s eligibility.
Querying each voter is the more secure way, because the operators of the election have
then no access to the complete electoral register. The API just needs to return true if she
is eligible and else false. But this API must be provided by the government.
As outlined in the construction chapter, the eID provides the best functionality for au-
thentication and verification of the voter, because the eID is easy to use and provides the
key-pair needed to sign the ballot.
How the verification is realized depends on the technical possibilities provided by the
government.
6.1.2 Coercion Freeness
Coercion is still a big problem. Our constructed system only reduces coercion, but is
not able to prevent it completely (see 5.2). This is achieved with the multiple-votes
philosophy and the expensive credentials (see 5.1). Vote-buying is unlikely, because
expensive credentials can be used for multiple services and are not exclusively for an
election. But timing-attacks are still possible, as we already described in 5.8.
Therefore, our constructed system is not completely coercion-resistant, but drastically
reduces coercion. This is currently best practice, but needs more research in this field.
The importance of coercion-freeness is discussed in subsection 6.3.1.
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6.1.3 Availability
Availability can be achieved by replication and distributing each element of the voting
system and to provide mechanisms against DDoS attacks, like crypto-puzzles. In sec-
tion 5.4 we suggested two approaches to guarantee the availability and stability, whilst
we focus here only on the distribution of the servers, because the blockchain approach
currently has too many issues (see 5.5.4).
Servers distributed in multiple data centers provide enough capacity to realize the elec-
tion. Moreover, the redundancy of the servers lead to a sufficient availability, since an
attacker might attack for example a ballot box in data center A, but there are still other
ballot boxes available in data center B. A ballot box might be compromised and drop or
manipulate ballots, but the voter has the possibility to choose a different box accepting
her vote.
Our suggestion was to distribute the servers into multiple data centers, which prevents
many kinds of attacks and increases security and availability because of the stated rea-
sons.
6.1.4 Ballot Anonymity and Election Secrecy
We use the homomorphic encryption ElGamal in our constructed system with the prop-
erties of re-encryption and distribution of the private key (see 5.9.1). The election’s
private key is distributed among the election’s authorities (see 3.5), and we defined that
all trustees are needed to reconstruct the private key. We assumed in section 2.1 that not
all authorities are corrupt. Therefore, the ballot’s anonymity is guaranteed, because there
are not enough malicious authorities to reconstruct the key and hence they are not able
to decrypt the ballots.
As a consequence, the ballots are only decrypted after the mix-net and before the vote
count, because the election’s trustees reconstruct the private key after the ballots are
anonymized. This ensures anonymity and secrecy during the complete election, which is
just what we have to provide in a secure voting system according to chapter 2.
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6.1.5 Integrity
Since the ballots are encrypted using a homomorphic scheme, their content is not alter-
able without the private key. The voter’s signature, which is connected with the vote until
the ballots are anonymized in the mix-net, ensures the integrity of the ballot. Each step
of the ballot anonymization is verifiable with the published zero-knowledge-proof. So
we can assume that the ballot’s integrity is granted up to the decryption, which is again
proven correct with a ZKP (see 5.12).
The ballot’s signature is added on the voter’s machine and not modified during the com-
plete voting process (see 5.9.1). As long as we can rely on the security of the correctly
applied homomorphic cryptography, we can be sure that the ballot has not been altered
and the correct choice of the voter arrives in the vote count.
6.1.6 Correctness
The proof-of-correct-decryption for all ballots gives us the possibility to verify that the
ballot’s content has not been modified in the tallying process. We can then publish the
results of the ballots, combined with the ZKPs, to provide the possibility to verify the
outcome. If the sum is in order and the decryption is verifiable, the system is proven
correct.
Combined with the logging server described in 5.6, we can keep track of the ballots to
guarantee that none of them were dropped. So, if all ballots arrive on the tallying servers
and are correctly decrypted, calculating the correct outcome of the election is trivial and
verifiable thanks to the public proofs-of-correct-decryption (see 5.12).
6.1.7 Robustness
Malicious ballots or ballot’s with false content (i.e. content not belonging to an election)
can only be detected during the tallying process, because the ballot’s content is only
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revealed in the tallying process when the ballots are being decrypted. There can also
be only a maximum of one falsy ballot per eligible citizen, since all older ballots are
automatically discarded and just the most recent ballot is stored (see 5.9.2).
The ballot’s content is validated directly after the decryption (see 5.10). It includes mech-
anisms to encode the ballot’s content to provide a protection against code intrusion. If it
is correctly implemented, the system will be robust against malicious code in the ballots,
because encoded malicious code can not be executed on the e-voting servers.
6.1.8 Fairness
If partial results were allowed during an election, the voter would be influenced by these
results. She might reconsider her choice due to these results and vote a different way. But
the voter should not be manipulated by early results or polls, rather she should vote for
the party she prefers. Even polls during the elections, which try to construct pre-results,
influence the eligible voters who have not voted yet [BGN01].
During the European Parliament elections in 2014, the European Commission warned
the countries not to publish their results until all states have tallied their ballots [POL14].
With this announcement they tried to let all voters place her vote without the influence
of real results, which underlines the importance of this preliminary.
Electronic voting systems have to follow common practices in current elections and must
not publish early results. Our system waits for the end of the election, shuffles the ballots
and then decrypts them (see 5.10). With this design, it is not possible to get partial results,
because only the election’s trustees are able to reconstruct the private key to decrypt the
ballots (see 5.9.1), which is done when the election ended. Thus, this preliminary is
completely fulfilled.
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6.1.9 Receipt Freeness and Voter Verifiability
In traditional paper elections, for example in Germany, each voter receives her ballot in
a polling place, makes her private choice and puts the paper-sheet into the ballot box.
She does this herself and is therefore able to verify that nobody manipulates or watches
her choice until she puts it into the ballot box. After this step, she can observe the vote
tally of the ballots boxes in her district and can verify with her own eyes that no votes
are dropped or manipulated.
For electronic voting systems, we have to implement these steps as similar and compre-
hensibly as it is stated above. This is why each voter gets at least a temporary receipt,
with which the voter can verify that her vote was counted (see 5.11). This ensures trust in
the system and can easily be implemented by sending the voter a QR code, a numerical
PIN or similar.
This fulfills voter verifiability and receipt freeness, but has some problems, which are
discussed in 6.3.2.
6.1.10 Universal Verifiability
As seen in 6.1.9, voters have in classical elections the possibility to observe the vote count
in their electoral district, but not the complete election. With electronic voting systems,
it is possible to make the complete election verifiable with the help of cryptography.
To achieve universal verifiability, it is sufficient to publish the zero-knowledge-proofs
after each step of the mix-net and after each decrypted ballot as described in 5.12. For
this purpose, our system generates the needed ZKPs for universal verifiability.
It might be possible for an attacker to manipulate masses of ballots in an electronic
voting system; only one vulnerability in the system might be sufficient to compromise
(at least one of) the servers to be able to manipulate the ballots. Since we can never
be sure that our system is 100 percent secure, we can provide mechanisms to observe
the election. For this purpose, we suggest the logging server and the zero-knowledge-
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proofs; they provide verifiable information, which might reveal the manipulations by an
attacker. Thus, universal verifiability is needed and must be implemented as described in
our constructed voting system. The ZKPs, which should be published, are described in
(see 5.12) and fulfill this preliminary, because the all critical parts of the voting systems,
like the anonymization and decryption of the ballots, provide these zero-knowledge-
proofs.
6.1.11 Summary
The previous subsections summarize, which preliminaries are fulfilled and which are not.
This table shows a brief overview:
Evaluate the Voting System against the Preliminaries
Eligibility Completely
Coercion Reduced
Availability Completely
Anonymity Completely
Integrity Completely
Correctness Completely
Robustness Completely
Fairness Completely
Receipt Freeness Questionable
Voter Verifiability Completely
Universal Verifiability Completely
Table 6.1: Fulfilled Preliminaries of our Constructed Voting System
Some points cannot be completely fulfilled. We will discuss them in section 6.3.
85
Chapter 6 Evaluation
6.2 Comparison
Now, we want to focus on the real-world systems and our own system and evaluate,
which of the systems fulfills (most of) the requirements from the preliminaries. We still
have to keep in mind that our system from chapter 5 is still not implemented and exists
only as a theoretical construct.
We will use some color codings in table 6.2 to visualize whether the system fulfills the
requirements from chapter 2 completely, partly or not:
Preliminary completely fulfilled
Preliminary partly fulfilled
Preliminary not fulfilled
When it is unknown if the system fulfills a preliminary at all, the cell is left in white
color.
Although the receipt-freeness has some problems we are discussing in 6.3.1, we assume
it as fulfilled, when re-voting is allowed or there is no receipt generated at all.
Applied on the definitions of the real-world voting systems produces a short overview
comparing the requirements:
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Estonia DVBM Norway iVote Civitas
Our
System
Eligibility
Coercion
Availability
Anonymity
Integrity
Correctness
Robustness
Fairness
Receipt Freeness
Voter Verifiability
Univ. Verifiability
Table 6.2: Overview about the Fulfillments of the Preliminaries
Compared to Civitas it seems that we only achieve better results in eligibility (and cou-
pled thereto authorization). But our suggestions rely on experiences with real-world
systems and are more usable than the complicated implementations provided by Civitas
(see 7.1.3).
The building blocks of our system and those from Civitas fulfill most of the preliminaries
and none of the real-world systems come even close to the theoretical systems. There
are also nearly no possibilities to verify the outcome of the election, although calculat-
ing and publishing zero-knowledge-proofs leaks no information about the ballots. And
this might convince a sceptical voter that she can trust in the election and reassured vote
electronically in the next election.
Some real-world systems could easily implement mechanisms to fulfill the remaining
preliminaries (except coercion). For example the Estonian e-voting system, where avail-
ability, anonymity and universal verifiability are not (sufficiently) fulfilled. Using a mix-
net instead of only stripping off the signature and distributing the system into multiple
data centers would provide a verifiable anonymization and a much better availability. If
they would generate ZKPs when tallying the ballots and publish them together with the
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ZKPs from the mix-net, it would improve the Estonian system to fulfill as many require-
ments as our construction. This requires the Estonian e-voting system to choose ElGamal
as their encryption algorithm, because a mix-net needs the re-encryption property. Using
mix-nets and publishing all ZKPs would also improve the Norwegian e-voting system to
fulfill nearly all preliminaries.
Other systems, like DVBM, are not as easy to improve as the Estonian or Norwegian
system, because the general structure has more flaws, for example the PDF ballots and
non-existent client-side encryption of the ballots.
Influence of one Company – Scytl
It is very interesting to see that the Australian iVote performs much more badly than the
Norwegian system. Both systems are developed by the company Scytl, but it does not
seem that they used their experiences from the implementation of the Norwegian system
to build iVote; coercion, anonymity, universal verifiability and the general documenta-
tion is much worse than in Norway.
We tried to contact Scytl to get some more information about iVote and their implemen-
tation, which might show up the difference, but we only received a white paper defining
the company’s philosophy for an end-to-end verifiable voting system [Kha14], which
contains no concrete answers to our questions.
Scytl is also the developer of the new Swiss e-voting system, which will release in the
near future [Ver15]. We are interested in the implementation of this system, because it
currently seems that Scytl reduces security and leaves out other preliminaries for eco-
nomical reasons. And that is definitely not they way it should be, when a company with
sufficient knowledge and experience in building end-to-end verifiable and secure voting
systems leaves out critical parts for an electronic voting system.
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Figure 6.3: Scheme of Attacker Model [SMHM15]
6.3 Open Issues
Some preliminaries could not be fulfilled or at least need to be discussed further. In
this section we will concentrate on them and also take a closer look on problems of the
real-world elections, which are also relevant besides fulfilling the preliminaries.
6.3.1 Coercion
Coercion is one of the few points, which can not be completely solved. In the best case
we can reduce it, which is not really a satisfying solution. We now want to present an
attack vector, which enables timing attacks and thus coercion.
Anonymous Communication between Voter and Voting System
The preliminaries do not elaborate on the anonymous connection between voter and the
ballot box. This is an issue, because timing attacks are possible even when a low-latency
network is used. We evaluated this in detail with a toy example inside a big simulated
Tor network in [SMHM15]. Our strategy was to think about the TCP transfer pattern
when placing a ballot, e.g. a TCP handshake, payload (the ballot) and then closing the
connection. This is a typical pattern, which will look the same with nearly all ballots and
enables this timing attack.
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In our attacker model, the adversary has access to the traffic of (at least) one ISP and is
able to observe the traffic to (some of) the ballot boxes (see figure 6.3). Now, we can try
to find the pattern of sending a ballot in the TCP dump of the observed traffic. With only
few parameters and no special knowledge in finding patterns in a large amount of data,
we were able to find about 95% of the possible findable voters and could prove, that they
placed their vote. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we were able to read the content
of the ciphertext.
A possible attack on an election might look like this: if an attacker wants to manipulate
the outcome of an election, she could force a whole group of eligible voters to stay
completely absent of the election. The network-attacker, who is able to observe the
described parts of the network, has with the TCP pattern-analysis a simple mechanism
to prove with a high percentage, if the voters really stayed absent or not.
This is an attack vector with the possibility to manipulate the results of relevant elections,
because there are always districts known to usually vote for a certain party. Therefore,
coercing these regions has a non-negligible impact on the results.
Discussion It is obvious that low-latency networks, like Tor, are susceptible for this
kind of attack. A possible solution to hide the traffic of the ballot, would be noise traffic.
But this would also be suspicious and could be recognized by the attacker, because this
is generally just a bigger pattern which must be found.
High-latency networks, like Mixminion [DDM03], Nonesuch [HBSD06] and Freenet
[CSWH01], might be the possible solution, because timing attacks are not possible, but
this method does not fit to electronic voting. How usable is a system, where you have
to wait at least four hours until your ballot was counted? The user has a high interest in
verifying her vote directly and not much later. Therefore, existing high-latency networks
do not seem to fit with electronic voting.
Placing the ballot boxes inside the low-latency network as a hidden service might be a
solution, because the attacker is no longer able to watch the incoming traffic of the ballot
boxes. But as long as the user exclusively uses the low-latency network for placing a
ballot and normally browses the web without anonymous channel, it is trivial to find the
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moment the voter placed her ballot.
We have no complete answer to solve this question. Further research is needed in this
regard, because low-latency and high-latency networks alike do not completely solve
coercion or are not suitable for an e-voting system.
This is a big thing, because network-observing attackers are very likely nowadays; the
New York Times published a document from the Signals Intelligence of the United States
describing that electronic voting systems even invite them to be exploited [The13]. From
this leaked SIGINT Mission Strategic Plan FY2008-2013 descends the quote:
“Internet-centric activities such as e-commerce, e-voting, and on-net indus-
trial and utility control beg to be mined, even as we expand existing opera-
tions against both public and private nets.”
They did not explicitly say that they observe the network for this kind of attack, but this
statement should alarm us to be prepared for all kinds of attacks. Therefore, we can not
close our eyes on this possibility to coerce eligible voters.
6.3.2 Voter Verifiability
Whenever we try to implement voter verifiability, we reveal the ballot’s content, because
the vote itself or an encoded version of it is displayed on a screen or similar. It is always
possible to make a screenshot or take a photo of it to get a receipt of the ballot. This
breaks receipt-freeness and enables coercion, since the voter is now able to prove her
vote to a coercer.
This receipt is worthless when the voter casts a new ballot. Therefore, she has the possi-
bility to verify her vote, whereby she again gets some kind of receipt to verify her vote.
This is again a (temporary) receipt, which can be copied and shown to a coercer.
With current technologies it is always possible to make a copy of the receipt to get a per-
manent receipt of the vote. But if we remove this feature, it would be no longer possible
to verify her vote. A system without voter verification is not end-to-end verifiable and
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ensures no trust in the users, who are supposed to use the system; they could never be
sure that their vote was really counted properly.
A step towards receipt freeness is the way Norway implements voter verifiability: they
send a poll card via postal mail to each voter. The displayed code after the ballot was
placed shows the digits of the corresponding party she voted for. Therefore, the coercer
needs a screenshot of the PIN on the display and the polling card to have some kind of
receipt. This is a bit more complicated, but has the same problem like normal receipts:
she can take a photo of the polling card with the PIN side by side to have a permanent
receipt.
Other Problems with Temporary Receipts
A compromised system could easily wait the time a user has to verify her vote, before
the attacker changes or drops the vote. Consider Estonia: the voter has 30 minutes to
verify the vote with her smartphone and a QR code. After this time, the voter has no
possibility to do so, therefore she has to trust in the system. But an attacker could drop
or manipulate her vote after these 30 minutes (see 4.1.5).
Negligible due to Multiple Votes
Since we suggested multiple votes, each receipt is also overridden with a new ballot
casted to the ballot boxes. Therefore, these receipts are not really increasing coercion,
because the voter could easily place again her vote, even after “proving” her vote to a
coercer; she just casts a new ballot, receives a new receipt and the old one is replaced.
A possible attack vector is still a coercer, who forces the voter to place her vote shortly
before the election ends, so that she has no possibility to place a new ballot, but we do
not think that this attack is extensively possible.
It is still questionable whether temporary receipts are conform to the electoral laws of
the appropriate country, because they enable making copies of them to keep a permanent
receipt. Obviously, this is no problem in countries like Estonia or Norway, but this is not
assumable in general for all countries.
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6.3.3 Operational Security and Human Errors
Alex Halderman et al. impressively describe in the papers about the Estonian [HHK+14]
and the South Wales voting systems [HT15] how big the impact of the system administra-
tors are. We already showed a small list of these problems in the systems in subsections
4.1.5 and 4.4.3.
Most of these problems come apparently because of missing knowledge in security or
a general missing sense for it. For example Estonia: To achieve the biggest possible
amount of transparency, the maintainers of the system installed webcams and streamed
meetings to the Internet (without sound, as far as we know), where it was possible to
watch an administrator type in the root password, while the camera was pointing on her
keyboard. Or to see the PIN, which is needed for one of the administrator’s eID card or
to get access to the wifi-network, because the passphrase was pinned to a wall.
The recordings of these webcams were the basics of the analysis of Halderman et al. to
provide founded criticism against their practices during the election.
A general sense for critical data and security would solve many of the flaws described
in these papers. But there must also be mechanisms to systematically reduce operational
errors.
Bad Implementation
Errors during the development of the system are somehow natural. But these errors must
be reduced, e.g. with hundred percent test coverage of the code and (peer) reviewing the
source code. This reduces unexpected behavior, which was the entry point for the at-
tack in the Washington, D.C. DVBM voting system: a manually modified version of the
Paperclip1 module was used, which handles file attachments, like the PDF ballot. Their
version was based on an old release of the module and had a shell injection vulnerability,
which has already been fixed in a newer release by the developers of the module and was
available when they deployed the voting system.
1https://github.com/thoughtbot/paperclip
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The maintainers of DVBM were aware of the vulnerability and tried to fix them by them-
selves. But with no success, which made the attack of Wolchok et al. possible [WWIH10].
These are only few examples of problems based on human errors. Many of them can be
detected before the official election when using a complete testing coverage and provid-
ing the possibility to get the code reviewed by security experts and the community.
6.3.4 Insider Attacks
An insider is “usually a trusted employee, student, or contractor that is granted a higher
level of trust than an outsider” [Rup09]. A higher level of trust means in our context that
this person has access to (parts of) the voting system. Among others are those insiders
the administrators maintaining the system. In parts of the webcam-recordings of the
Estonian voting systems some of these administrators are logged in as the root user,
having total access to the server she is logged on, she could for example copy or drop
passing ballots without leaving a trail to herself.
The ballots might be securely encrypted for nowadays, but there will be computers in
the future, which do not need much time to decrypt the ballots, even without the private
key. And an insider, who copied all ballots and took them with her without being caught,
would be able to decrypt the ballots or de-anonymize them. Using everlasting privacy as
described in section 3.6 could decrease the possibility to decrypt the ballots and should
therefore be considered when designing the next electronic voting system.
To prevent insider attacks, a possible solution are users and groups for different levels of
permissions. There are several publications in this field, which can be taken into concern
to reduce the possibility of an insider attack [Lyn06, Rup09].
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Conclusion
In this thesis we describe and analyze the general structure of the biggest internet vot-
ing systems being used so far. Many countries are involved in the development of secure
electronic voting systems and we could therefore pick the most relevant around the globe,
which were practically used or were supposed to be used in parliamentary elections.
Our analysis starts with the description of the cryptographic primitives over the com-
plete voting process up to the security flaws each system has.
Each analyzed system is unique in the way it solves the problems of electronic voting.
All aim to be secure, anonymous and trustworthy so that the eligible users are ready to
participate via Internet in the election. With the knowledge we gained during the analysis
of existing systems and their failures, we construct a theoretical end-to-end verifiable
electronic voting system, which fulfills more preliminaries than the real-world e-voting
systems from chapter 4. Our system also aims to eliminate many of the original system’s
flaws or at least reduce them. The construction chapter can be used as a template to
implement a voting system, which fulfills most of the preliminaries.
There are still problems with coercion, which need to be solved if the system is supposed
to be used in parliamentary elections. We have no answer how to prevent timing-attacks
and are not sure if it is even possible to solve this issue (see 6.3.1).
We also focused on a peer-to-peer approach of an electronic voting system. With the
help of the blockchain, we get the possibility to implement a peer-to-peer e-voting sys-
tem, which does not exclusively rely on the election’s officials and gives each eligible
95
Chapter 7 Conclusion
voter the possibility to actively participate in the election. Some companies already try
to build voting systems with the help of the blockchain, but none of them have produced
a working example.
Our contribution to this topic is a modified version of the proof-of-stake, which makes
it possible to construct a secure blockchain without needing masses of computational
power to discover the specific hashes needed for the proof-of-work, which are used by
the Bitcoin protocol. This even allows small devices, like smartphones, to participate
in the network to ensure the blockchain’s integrity. It can be easily implemented as a
small application, which keeps the voter’s device online to work as a full node in the
blockchain-based peer-to-peer voting system.
Although we constructed our system with a focus on the security flaws of the real-world
systems, we are not able to eliminate all of these issues, namely coercion. Therefore, we
come round to the general opinion of other scientists, like Alex Halderman, and advice
not to use electronic voting systems in coercion-relevant elections, e.g. parliamentary
elections, until these open questions are satisfactorily answered. Coercion and other
operational flaws enable the manipulation of an election and must be eliminated, before
e-voting should be used in the real-world.
Electronic voting systems should only be used when there are no concerns about their
security. These issues might be solved in the next years and there are many promising
publications in this field, but they are temporarily not adaptable due to their usability.
7.1 Future Work
We described the basic template with cryptographic primitives and building blocks pro-
vided by the best-practices in network security and with already implemented voting
systems. Now, there is still work necessary to a really secure voting system. Some
aspects have already been discussed in sections 5.8, 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.
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7.1.1 Secure Platform
In section 2.1 we assumed that we can trust the voter’s computer she is voting with.
But many computers are infected with viruses; some reports say that about 32% of all
computers in the world are infected with viruses and malware [dot13]. The real numbers
do not matter, but we can be sure that there will always be security issues in our computer
systems and that there might be some viruses attacking the ballots of electronic voting
systems from the voter’s computer. So, we have to research how to prevent malicious
software might being able to attack and manipulate electronic voting systems.
7.1.2 Programming Languages and Paradigms
We criticized in subsection 4.5.4 that Civitas used Jif in their implementation, which is an
unpopular programming language with only few people being able to use this language.
The Cornell University, who invented Civitas, also developed Jif1, which extends Java
with the support for information flow-control and access control. We should make this
an object to analyze other languages and check, if they are more suitable for security-
critical applications, like voting systems.
In further research we should also concern about different programming paradigms, like
logical or functional programming, and try to evaluate, which is the best choice in voting
systems.
7.1.3 Usability Analysis
Several voting schemes have been published, which aim to solve the last issues in elec-
tronic voting. These systems are mostly too complicated or have a very bad usability
experience, like Civitas. This is one reason why they are not successful and are not used
for real-world elections.
Usability is a very important point: if the voters do not understand how to use the voting
system, they will not try it. Therefore some guidelines should be designed to simplify
1https://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif
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voting systems and to have a road map, how the components should look like in the
front-end.
7.1.4 Implementation
Theoretical systems have the advantage that they solve all issues in theory, but it is not
possible to evaluate them in real elections. Therefore, this system needs to be imple-
mented for a real comparison with the other big voting systems.
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